feat(agents): allow per-invocation timeout override on shell/http tools #113

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CoreRasurae merged 1 commits from feature/m1-shell-timeout-override into master 2026-08-05 12:40:43 +00:00

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CoreRasurae commented 2026-08-04 23:01:33 +00:00

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Summary

Adds an optional per-invocation timeout argument to the shell and http_request tools so an LLM driving them can raise the execution limit for a single long-running call — instead of being told to "increase the timeout config value", which it cannot do at runtime. The model previously threaded timeout N into the call, corrupting the command.

• New immutable TimeoutPolicy value object resolves the effective timeout.
• Generic max_timeout config field (default 120s) bounds any override; an optional shell-only shell_max_timeout refines the ceiling for shell alone and is never consulted by http_request.
• Absent the argument, behaviour is byte-for-byte unchanged. Invalid overrides are rejected before any subprocess is spawned / request is sent. Timeout errors now direct a retry with a larger timeout argument.

Specification / ADR

• docs/adr/ADR-2030-tool-calling-spec-extensions.md D-9 (accepted revision).
• Actor Configuration Standard §4.5 + §21.1 → Version 1.2.0 (adds the generic max_timeout field).

Testing

• Behave: features/shell_timeout_override.feature — 32 scenarios (shell + http, including one proving shell_max_timeout does not leak into http_request). Full suite green (2943 scenarios, 0 failed).
• Robot: robot/shell_timeout_override.robot — 4 real-subprocess integration tests.
• ASV: benchmarks/timeout_policy_benchmark.py.
• Coverage 96.7% (new files: timeout_policy.py 100%, llm_tools.py 100%, tool.py 98%). lint / format / typecheck / security / dead_code all green.

Closes #111

## Summary Adds an optional per-invocation `timeout` argument to the `shell` and `http_request` tools so an LLM driving them can raise the execution limit for a single long-running call — instead of being told to "increase the timeout config value", which it cannot do at runtime. The model previously threaded `timeout N` into the call, corrupting the command. - New immutable `TimeoutPolicy` value object resolves the effective timeout. - Generic `max_timeout` config field (default 120s) bounds any override; an optional shell-only `shell_max_timeout` refines the ceiling for `shell` alone and is **never** consulted by `http_request`. - Absent the argument, behaviour is byte-for-byte unchanged. Invalid overrides are rejected before any subprocess is spawned / request is sent. Timeout errors now direct a retry with a larger `timeout` argument. ## Specification / ADR - `docs/adr/ADR-2030-tool-calling-spec-extensions.md` **D-9** (accepted revision). - Actor Configuration Standard §4.5 + §21.1 → **Version 1.2.0** (adds the generic `max_timeout` field). ## Testing - **Behave:** `features/shell_timeout_override.feature` — 32 scenarios (shell + http, including one proving `shell_max_timeout` does not leak into `http_request`). Full suite green (2943 scenarios, 0 failed). - **Robot:** `robot/shell_timeout_override.robot` — 4 real-subprocess integration tests. - **ASV:** `benchmarks/timeout_policy_benchmark.py`. - Coverage **96.7%** (new files: `timeout_policy.py` 100%, `llm_tools.py` 100%, `tool.py` 98%). lint / format / typecheck / security / dead_code all green. Closes #111

CoreRasurae added this to the v2.1.0 milestone 2026-08-04 23:01:34 +00:00

CoreRasurae added the

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label 2026-08-04 23:01:35 +00:00

hurui200320 approved these changes 2026-08-05 05:51:56 +00:00

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PR Review: !113 (Ticket #111)

Verdict: Approve

The implementation cleanly realizes ADR-2030 D-9 and the Actor Configuration Standard §4.5 / §21.1 (Version 1.2.0) changes. The TimeoutPolicy value object is a good abstraction, validation happens before any subprocess/request, the timeout control argument is never concatenated into the shell command, and the error messages now point the model at the actionable per-call lever. Tests (Behave, Robot, ASV) are comprehensive and the commit/branch hygiene matches the ticket metadata. Only minor gaps/note-level items remain.

Critical Issues

None

Major Issues

None

Minor Issues

1. Missing regression scenario for the original bug shape (timeout + positional args)

   • File: features/shell_timeout_override.feature
   • The original failure trace in #111 was the model injecting timeout N into the positional args list, which got concatenated onto the command line. The code now correctly reads args.get("timeout") separately from args["args"], but there is no Behave/Robot scenario that supplies both a per-call timeout and a positional args list and asserts the output is uncorrupted. Adding one scenario would close the regression loop explicitly.

2. TimeoutPolicy module docstring is slightly stale

   • File: src/cleveractors/agents/timeout_policy.py, lines 1–9
   • The docstring says the policy "backs the shell tool's per-invocation timeout argument today … and is reusable by any future tool." Since _http_request_tool also uses TimeoutPolicy today, the wording implies only shell consumes it. Rephrase to mention both current consumers or drop the "today / future" framing.

3. Invalid timeout ceilings are validated lazily

   • File: src/cleveractors/agents/tool.py, lines 325–362
   • An invalid max_timeout or shell_max_timeout is only detected when the first timeout-honouring tool is invoked, not at ToolAgent construction. For faster failure of misconfigured agents, consider validating these config fields in __init__ (or in the policy builders called from __init__).

4. Coverage sits between two documented thresholds

   • The PR reports 96.7% coverage. This passes the noxfile.py constant (COVERAGE_THRESHOLD = 96.5), but CONTRIBUTING.md states the project-specific enforced merge gate is 97%. Please confirm the actual nox -s coverage_report output; if it is below 97%, add targeted tests to meet the documented gate (the project may also need to reconcile the noxfile constant with CONTRIBUTING.md).

Nits

1. ShellTimeoutLib exposes a raw ValueError on bad timeout strings

   • File: robot/ShellTimeoutLib.py, line 36
   • float(timeout) will raise ValueError if the Robot test passes a non-numeric string. Wrapping this in an ExecutionError (or validating and raising AssertionError) would give clearer Robot failure output.

2. Empty benchmark teardown

   • File: benchmarks/timeout_policy_benchmark.py, lines 32–33
   • The teardown method is a no-op. It is harmless, but can be removed or annotated with a comment if state cleanup is truly unnecessary.

Summary

Solid, well-scoped change. The per-invocation timeout argument is implemented correctly for both shell and http_request, the ceiling logic (max_timeout / shell_max_timeout) is clean and properly separated, and the schema/documentation/spec updates are all in place. The only substantive follow-ups are adding the timeout+args regression scenario and clarifying the coverage threshold situation; neither blocks approval.

## PR Review: !113 (Ticket #111) ### Verdict: Approve The implementation cleanly realizes ADR-2030 D-9 and the Actor Configuration Standard §4.5 / §21.1 (Version 1.2.0) changes. The `TimeoutPolicy` value object is a good abstraction, validation happens before any subprocess/request, the `timeout` control argument is never concatenated into the shell command, and the error messages now point the model at the actionable per-call lever. Tests (Behave, Robot, ASV) are comprehensive and the commit/branch hygiene matches the ticket metadata. Only minor gaps/note-level items remain. ### Critical Issues None ### Major Issues None ### Minor Issues 1. **Missing regression scenario for the original bug shape (`timeout` + positional `args`)** - **File:** `features/shell_timeout_override.feature` - The original failure trace in #111 was the model injecting `timeout N` into the positional `args` list, which got concatenated onto the command line. The code now correctly reads `args.get("timeout")` separately from `args["args"]`, but there is no Behave/Robot scenario that supplies **both** a per-call `timeout` and a positional `args` list and asserts the output is uncorrupted. Adding one scenario would close the regression loop explicitly. 2. **`TimeoutPolicy` module docstring is slightly stale** - **File:** `src/cleveractors/agents/timeout_policy.py`, lines 1–9 - The docstring says the policy "backs the `shell` tool's per-invocation `timeout` argument today … and is reusable by any future tool." Since `_http_request_tool` also uses `TimeoutPolicy` today, the wording implies only `shell` consumes it. Rephrase to mention both current consumers or drop the "today / future" framing. 3. **Invalid timeout ceilings are validated lazily** - **File:** `src/cleveractors/agents/tool.py`, lines 325–362 - An invalid `max_timeout` or `shell_max_timeout` is only detected when the first timeout-honouring tool is invoked, not at `ToolAgent` construction. For faster failure of misconfigured agents, consider validating these config fields in `__init__` (or in the policy builders called from `__init__`). 4. **Coverage sits between two documented thresholds** - The PR reports **96.7%** coverage. This passes the `noxfile.py` constant (`COVERAGE_THRESHOLD = 96.5`), but `CONTRIBUTING.md` states the project-specific enforced merge gate is **97%**. Please confirm the actual `nox -s coverage_report` output; if it is below 97%, add targeted tests to meet the documented gate (the project may also need to reconcile the noxfile constant with `CONTRIBUTING.md`). ### Nits 1. **`ShellTimeoutLib` exposes a raw `ValueError` on bad timeout strings** - **File:** `robot/ShellTimeoutLib.py`, line 36 - `float(timeout)` will raise `ValueError` if the Robot test passes a non-numeric string. Wrapping this in an `ExecutionError` (or validating and raising `AssertionError`) would give clearer Robot failure output. 2. **Empty benchmark `teardown`** - **File:** `benchmarks/timeout_policy_benchmark.py`, lines 32–33 - The `teardown` method is a no-op. It is harmless, but can be removed or annotated with a comment if state cleanup is truly unnecessary. ### Summary Solid, well-scoped change. The per-invocation `timeout` argument is implemented correctly for both `shell` and `http_request`, the ceiling logic (`max_timeout` / `shell_max_timeout`) is clean and properly separated, and the schema/documentation/spec updates are all in place. The only substantive follow-ups are adding the `timeout`+`args` regression scenario and clarifying the coverage threshold situation; neither blocks approval.

CoreRasurae commented 2026-08-05 09:55:26 +00:00

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In the review issuecomment 321954, Minor, Issue 4, the coverage is a non-issue, since the 96.5% threshold rounds to the 97% threshold in the documentation and it is meant to be that way. The current coverage of 96.7% is within the specified range.

In the review issuecomment 321954, Minor, Issue 4, the coverage is a non-issue, since the 96.5% threshold rounds to the 97% threshold in the documentation and it is meant to be that way. The current coverage of 96.7% is within the specified range.

CoreRasurae commented 2026-08-05 10:23:48 +00:00

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Thanks for the review, @hurui200320! Addressed the Minor issues; Nit 1 fixed, Nit 2 kept as-is (see below). Confirmed all four against §4.5/ADR-2030 before applying — none conflict with the spec.

Minor 1 (missing timeout+args regression scenario) — Added. Two new Behave scenarios in features/shell_timeout_override.feature reproduce the original bug shape directly: a positional args list containing the literal tokens "timeout"/"99" alongside a real per-call timeout control argument, asserting the output is exactly the harmless concatenated text ("marker timeout 99") and that the override still functions (a sleep 2 succeeds under timeout=4 even with args present). Also added a matching Robot regression test.

Minor 2 (stale TimeoutPolicy docstring) — Fixed. Now states it backs the per-invocation timeout argument on both shell and http_request today, dropping the "today / future" framing.

Minor 3 (lazy ceiling validation) — Fixed. ToolAgent.__init__ now eagerly builds both timeout policies and converts a ValueError into AgentCreationError, so a misconfigured tools_max_timeout/shell_max_timeout fails at construction, not on first call. As a consequence, the two call sites (_execute_shell_command, _http_request_tool) no longer need their own try/except ValueError — the ceiling is guaranteed valid by the time they run, per ADR-2030 D-9 (updated in place with a bullet documenting this). The two existing "invalid ceiling" scenarios now assert AgentCreationError at construction time instead of ExecutionError at call time.

Minor 4 (coverage 96.5% vs 97%) — No code change; per @CoreRasurae's earlier reply this is an intentional pre-existing project-wide threshold choice, outside this ticket's scope (not part of the Actor Configuration Standard or ADR-2030). Independently verified: a coverage run scoped to the feature-relevant BDD files shows timeout_policy.py and llm_tools.py at 100%, and none of the changed/added lines in tool.py appear in that scoped run's missing-lines list — the new eager-validation code is fully exercised. Also confirmed the full 2945-scenario suite still passes with 0 failures after these changes (no regressions from touching the shared ToolAgent.__init__ path).

Nit 1 (ShellTimeoutLib raw ValueError) — Fixed. Added a _parse_timeout helper that raises a clear AssertionError on a non-numeric timeout string; added a Robot test case (Non Numeric Timeout Argument Fails With A Clear Message) exercising it.

Nit 2 (empty benchmark teardown) — Left as-is. It matches the established setup/time_*/teardown lifecycle convention used by the other benchmarks in this repo (e.g. hello_benchmark.py), so removing it would make this benchmark inconsistent with house style for near-zero benefit.

Ran nox -s lint / format --check / typecheck / dead_code / security_scan (all green), the full Behave suite (146 features, 2945 scenarios, 0 failed), and the Robot integration suite for this feature (5/5 passed) after applying the above.

Thanks for the review, @hurui200320! Addressed the Minor issues; Nit 1 fixed, Nit 2 kept as-is (see below). Confirmed all four against §4.5/ADR-2030 before applying — none conflict with the spec. **Minor 1 (missing `timeout`+`args` regression scenario)** — Added. Two new Behave scenarios in `features/shell_timeout_override.feature` reproduce the original bug shape directly: a positional `args` list containing the literal tokens `"timeout"`/`"99"` alongside a real per-call `timeout` control argument, asserting the output is exactly the harmless concatenated text (`"marker timeout 99"`) and that the override still functions (a `sleep 2` succeeds under `timeout=4` even with `args` present). Also added a matching Robot regression test. **Minor 2 (stale `TimeoutPolicy` docstring)** — Fixed. Now states it backs the per-invocation `timeout` argument on *both* `shell` and `http_request` today, dropping the "today / future" framing. **Minor 3 (lazy ceiling validation)** — Fixed. `ToolAgent.__init__` now eagerly builds both timeout policies and converts a `ValueError` into `AgentCreationError`, so a misconfigured `tools_max_timeout`/`shell_max_timeout` fails at construction, not on first call. As a consequence, the two call sites (`_execute_shell_command`, `_http_request_tool`) no longer need their own `try/except ValueError` — the ceiling is guaranteed valid by the time they run, per ADR-2030 D-9 (updated in place with a bullet documenting this). The two existing "invalid ceiling" scenarios now assert `AgentCreationError` at construction time instead of `ExecutionError` at call time. **Minor 4 (coverage 96.5% vs 97%)** — No code change; per @CoreRasurae's earlier reply this is an intentional pre-existing project-wide threshold choice, outside this ticket's scope (not part of the Actor Configuration Standard or ADR-2030). Independently verified: a coverage run scoped to the feature-relevant BDD files shows `timeout_policy.py` and `llm_tools.py` at 100%, and none of the changed/added lines in `tool.py` appear in that scoped run's missing-lines list — the new eager-validation code is fully exercised. Also confirmed the full 2945-scenario suite still passes with 0 failures after these changes (no regressions from touching the shared `ToolAgent.__init__` path). **Nit 1 (`ShellTimeoutLib` raw `ValueError`)** — Fixed. Added a `_parse_timeout` helper that raises a clear `AssertionError` on a non-numeric `timeout` string; added a Robot test case (`Non Numeric Timeout Argument Fails With A Clear Message`) exercising it. **Nit 2 (empty benchmark `teardown`)** — Left as-is. It matches the established `setup`/`time_*`/`teardown` lifecycle convention used by the other benchmarks in this repo (e.g. `hello_benchmark.py`), so removing it would make this benchmark inconsistent with house style for near-zero benefit. Ran `nox -s lint / format --check / typecheck / dead_code / security_scan` (all green), the full Behave suite (146 features, 2945 scenarios, 0 failed), and the Robot integration suite for this feature (5/5 passed) after applying the above.

CoreRasurae force-pushed feature/m1-shell-timeout-override from e3b675b7d2 to f19714a3da 2026-08-05 10:27:18 +00:00 Compare

CoreRasurae added 1 commit 2026-08-05 12:13:21 +00:00

feat(agents): allow per-invocation timeout override on shell/http tools ... 0133520555

The tool agent `timeout` config field (Actor Configuration Standard §4.5,
default 1s) was a static per-agent value, and the shell/http_request timeout
errors told the model to "increase the timeout config value" — an action an
LLM driving the tool cannot take at runtime. The model would instead thread
`timeout N` into the call, corrupting the command.

Both tools now accept an optional per-call `timeout` argument, resolved by a
new immutable `TimeoutPolicy` value object and bounded by a generic
`tools_max_timeout` config field (default 120s). An optional shell-only
`shell_max_timeout` refines the ceiling for `shell` alone and is never
consulted by `http_request`. Absent the argument, behaviour is byte-for-byte
unchanged. Invalid overrides are rejected before any subprocess is spawned or
request is sent; the timeout errors now direct a retry with a larger `timeout`
argument.

Implements ADR-2030 D-9 (accepted revision) and Actor Configuration Standard
§4.5 / §21.1 (Version 1.2.0).

ISSUES CLOSED: #111

CoreRasurae force-pushed feature/m1-shell-timeout-override from f19714a3da to 0133520555 2026-08-05 12:13:21 +00:00 Compare

CoreRasurae merged commit 0133520555 into master 2026-08-05 12:40:43 +00:00

CoreRasurae deleted branch feature/m1-shell-timeout-override 2026-08-05 12:40:56 +00:00

CoreRasurae referenced this pull request 2026-08-05 12:44:46 +00:00

Allow the shell and http_request tool timeouts to be overridden per invocation via a `timeout` argument #111

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aditya (Aditya Chhabra) aleenaumair (Aleena Umair) brent.edwards (Brent Edwards) CoreRasurae (Luis Mendes) drew (Drew Morris) eugen.thaci (Eugen Thaci) freemo (Jeffrey Phillips Freeman) HAL9000 (HAL 9000) HAL9001 (HAL9001) hamza.khyari (Hamza Khyari) hurui200320 (Rui Hu) justin.morris khird (Kyle Hird) org.cleveragents

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Reference: cleveragents/cleveractors-core#113