feat(execution-limits): add structured ExecutionError kind/reason fields; enforce all 5 execution limits in PureLangGraph #44

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hurui200320 merged 1 commit from feat/execution-limits into master 2026-06-11 11:05:30 +00:00
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Summary

This PR implements Wave 6 of the CleverActors-Core integration (ADR-2029: Actor Execution Limits and Budget Enforcement via cleveractors-core). It adds structured error fields to ExecutionError and enforces all five per-request execution limits in PureLangGraph so the router can map limit breaches to the correct HTTP status codes (429 for budget exhaustion, 500 for missing_pricing_entry).

Motivation

The CleverThis router needs to enforce per-plan resource quotas and return accurate HTTP responses. Previously:

  • ExecutionError had no structured fields — the router couldn't programmatically determine why an execution failed.
  • PureLangGraph only enforced a hardcoded depth heuristic (silently returning the message on overflow, not raising).
  • No model-call, tool-call, timeout, or cost limits existed.

Changes

cleveractors/core/exceptions.py

  • Added kind: str = "" and reason: str = "" fields to ExecutionError.__init__. All existing raise ExecutionError(msg) call sites remain backward-compatible.

cleveractors/langgraph/pure_graph.py

  • PureLangGraph.__init__ now accepts limits: dict[str, Any] | None and pricing: dict[str, Any] | None (both default to {}).
  • M-3 fix: _limits and _pricing are stored as defensive copies (dict(limits) / copy.deepcopy(pricing)) so caller mutation after construction cannot silently change enforcement behaviour.
  • execute() resets per-execution counters (_model_call_count, _tool_call_count, _accumulated_cost) and wraps _execute_from_node() in asyncio.wait_for() when timeout_ms is in limits.
  • m-7 fix: timeout_ms is validated to be a positive number before passing to asyncio.wait_for(). A value of 0 or negative raises ExecutionError(kind="timeout") immediately with a clear diagnostic.
  • Bool guard for timeout_ms: float(True)==1.0 would silently set a 1ms timeout (making every request time out). Bool values are now rejected with ExecutionError(kind="timeout"), matching the pattern used for max_depth/max_model_calls/max_tool_calls.
  • C-2 fix: The end/END terminal node short-circuit is now at the very top of _execute_from_node(), before the depth check.
  • M-2 fix: When limits["max_depth"] is absent, the default ceiling is 2**31 - 1 per ADR-2029 spec.
  • M-4 fix: max_depth, max_model_calls, and max_tool_calls are validated with narrow try/except (TypeError, ValueError) blocks that raise structured ExecutionError with the correct kind field. Bool values are also rejected.
  • Bool guard for max_cost_usd: float(False)==0.0 would silently set a $0 budget; float(True)==1.0 would silently set a $1 budget. Bool values are now rejected with ExecutionError(kind="cost").
  • C-1 fix (corrected reason field): When float(max_cost_usd) fails (e.g., max_cost_usd="not-a-number"), the code now raises ExecutionError(kind="cost", reason="") instead of the previous reason="missing_pricing_entry". Per ADR-2029, reason="missing_pricing_entry" means "the pricing table does not contain an entry for the provider/model used." A malformed limit value is a router configuration error, not a missing pricing entry.
  • AGENT-type nodes check max_model_calls before execution (raises ExecutionError(kind="model_calls")).
  • TOOL-type nodes check max_tool_calls before execution (raises ExecutionError(kind="tool_calls")).
  • After each LLM node, cost is computed from pricing[provider][model] (rates in USD/1M tokens per ADR-2029), accumulated, and checked against max_cost_usd.
  • Missing pricing entries raise ExecutionError(kind="cost", reason="missing_pricing_entry") — zero-cost fallback is explicitly forbidden.
  • m-1 fix: Added logger.warning() when _node_token_usage is present but not a dict, so malformed values surface in production logs rather than silently disabling token accounting.
  • m-2 fix: _pt and _ct (prompt/completion token counts) are computed once at the top of the isinstance(_tok_info, dict) block and reused in both _node_usages.append() and the cost block, eliminating double _safe_token_int() calls.
  • M-1 fix: Parallel branch execution now cancels sibling tasks when one branch raises an exception, preventing continued budget spending after a limit breach.
  • N1 (comment added): except BaseException in the parallel execution block is now documented explaining why BaseException (not Exception) is required — asyncio.CancelledError is a BaseException in Python 3.8+.
  • N2/N3 fix: Removed import sys inside function bodies (moved to module level, then removed since print(..., file=sys.stderr) calls were replaced with self.logger.warning(...) calls for consistency with the rest of the codebase).

cleveractors/runtime_dispatch.py

  • _execute_graph() passes limits=executor.limits and pricing=executor.pricing to PureLangGraph().

cleveractors/__init__.py

  • ExecutionError added to imports and __all__.

New BDD tests (features/execution_limits.feature, 38 scenarios)

  • All 5 limit types verified to raise ExecutionError with the correct kind (and reason where applicable).
  • Missing pricing entry scenario: provider-missing and model-missing cases both tested.
  • C-1 coverage (corrected): Non-numeric max_cost_usd raises ExecutionError(kind="cost") with reason="" (not reason="missing_pricing_entry").
  • Bool max_cost_usd coverage: Bool False as max_cost_usd raises ExecutionError(kind="cost").
  • Bool timeout_ms coverage: Bool True as timeout_ms raises ExecutionError(kind="timeout").
  • Non-numeric/bool max_depth coverage: New scenarios verify ExecutionError(kind="depth") for non-numeric and bool max_depth values.
  • M-4 coverage: Non-numeric and bool max_model_calls/max_tool_calls raise structured errors.
  • m-7 coverage: timeout_ms=0 raises ExecutionError(kind="timeout").
  • m-1 coverage (strengthened): Non-dict _node_token_usage scenario now also asserts that a warning was logged (not just that no error was raised). The logger is patched in the Then step to capture the warning call.
  • m-4 coverage: Cost accumulation across two LLM nodes verified.
  • m-5 coverage: Completion tokens cost contribution verified.
  • m-6 fix: Happy-path scenarios now assert result is not None in addition to absence of error.
  • m-3 fix: Propagation scenario now patches PureLangGraph.__init__ to verify limits/pricing kwargs are actually passed by _execute_graph().
  • M-1 coverage (strengthened): Parallel graph scenario now uses a "splitter" node topology (since the start node handler only routes to next_nodes[0]). A branch_b_cancelled flag is set inside except asyncio.CancelledError and asserted in a new Then step, verifying that sibling cancellation actually occurred.
  • Scenario text fixes: "a parallel graph where one branch raises a depth error" → "a parallel graph where one branch raises an ExecutionError". "a graph with an LLM node using 1000 prompt tokens and max_cost_usd 1.00" → "a graph with an LLM node for non-numeric max_cost_usd validation" (the old Given text was misleading since the actual limit value is set in the When step).
  • ExecutionError export from cleveractors top-level verified.
  • Full dispatch path integration test — Executor.execute()_execute_graph()PureLangGraph limit enforcement verified end-to-end.
  • N5 fix: In-function imports removed from execution_limits_steps.py; patch, create_executor, and _pg_module are now top-level imports.

Updated cycle-detection tests

  • features/steps/pure_graph_coverage_steps.py: auto_finish_active self-loop and ping-pong bypass tests now track visit counts and assert visit_count[0] >= 2, matching the pattern already used in pure_graph_coverage_gaps_v2_steps.py. The ping-pong bypass test also makes the agent return a routing command (GOTO_agent:continue) so the "no routing command" early-exit does not fire before the ping-pong detection is exercised.

CHANGELOG.md

  • Added entry under [Unreleased] ### Added.

Known Limitations / Deferred Items

None. All review comments have been addressed.

Quality Gate Results

  • nox -e lint: pass
  • nox -e typecheck (Pyright): 0 errors
  • nox -e unit_tests: 2335/2335 scenarios pass
  • nox -e integration_tests: 156/156 tests pass
  • nox -e coverage_report: 97.2% (threshold 96.5%)

ADR Reference

This PR implements ADR-2029: Actor Execution Limits and Budget Enforcement via cleveractors-core — Wave 6 of the CleverActors integration epic (cleveragents/cleveragents-webapp#275).

Closes #15

## Summary This PR implements Wave 6 of the CleverActors-Core integration (ADR-2029: Actor Execution Limits and Budget Enforcement via cleveractors-core). It adds structured error fields to `ExecutionError` and enforces all five per-request execution limits in `PureLangGraph` so the router can map limit breaches to the correct HTTP status codes (429 for budget exhaustion, 500 for `missing_pricing_entry`). ## Motivation The CleverThis router needs to enforce per-plan resource quotas and return accurate HTTP responses. Previously: - `ExecutionError` had no structured fields — the router couldn't programmatically determine why an execution failed. - `PureLangGraph` only enforced a hardcoded depth heuristic (silently returning the message on overflow, not raising). - No model-call, tool-call, timeout, or cost limits existed. ## Changes ### `cleveractors/core/exceptions.py` - Added `kind: str = ""` and `reason: str = ""` fields to `ExecutionError.__init__`. All existing `raise ExecutionError(msg)` call sites remain backward-compatible. ### `cleveractors/langgraph/pure_graph.py` - `PureLangGraph.__init__` now accepts `limits: dict[str, Any] | None` and `pricing: dict[str, Any] | None` (both default to `{}`). - **M-3 fix**: `_limits` and `_pricing` are stored as defensive copies (`dict(limits)` / `copy.deepcopy(pricing)`) so caller mutation after construction cannot silently change enforcement behaviour. - `execute()` resets per-execution counters (`_model_call_count`, `_tool_call_count`, `_accumulated_cost`) and wraps `_execute_from_node()` in `asyncio.wait_for()` when `timeout_ms` is in limits. - **m-7 fix**: `timeout_ms` is validated to be a positive number before passing to `asyncio.wait_for()`. A value of 0 or negative raises `ExecutionError(kind="timeout")` immediately with a clear diagnostic. - **Bool guard for `timeout_ms`**: `float(True)==1.0` would silently set a 1ms timeout (making every request time out). Bool values are now rejected with `ExecutionError(kind="timeout")`, matching the pattern used for `max_depth`/`max_model_calls`/`max_tool_calls`. - **C-2 fix**: The `end`/`END` terminal node short-circuit is now at the very top of `_execute_from_node()`, before the depth check. - **M-2 fix**: When `limits["max_depth"]` is absent, the default ceiling is `2**31 - 1` per ADR-2029 spec. - **M-4 fix**: `max_depth`, `max_model_calls`, and `max_tool_calls` are validated with narrow `try/except (TypeError, ValueError)` blocks that raise structured `ExecutionError` with the correct `kind` field. Bool values are also rejected. - **Bool guard for `max_cost_usd`**: `float(False)==0.0` would silently set a $0 budget; `float(True)==1.0` would silently set a $1 budget. Bool values are now rejected with `ExecutionError(kind="cost")`. - **C-1 fix (corrected reason field)**: When `float(max_cost_usd)` fails (e.g., `max_cost_usd="not-a-number"`), the code now raises `ExecutionError(kind="cost", reason="")` instead of the previous `reason="missing_pricing_entry"`. Per ADR-2029, `reason="missing_pricing_entry"` means "the pricing table does not contain an entry for the provider/model used." A malformed limit value is a router configuration error, not a missing pricing entry. - AGENT-type nodes check `max_model_calls` before execution (raises `ExecutionError(kind="model_calls")`). - TOOL-type nodes check `max_tool_calls` before execution (raises `ExecutionError(kind="tool_calls")`). - After each LLM node, cost is computed from `pricing[provider][model]` (rates in USD/1M tokens per ADR-2029), accumulated, and checked against `max_cost_usd`. - Missing pricing entries raise `ExecutionError(kind="cost", reason="missing_pricing_entry")` — zero-cost fallback is explicitly forbidden. - **m-1 fix**: Added `logger.warning()` when `_node_token_usage` is present but not a dict, so malformed values surface in production logs rather than silently disabling token accounting. - **m-2 fix**: `_pt` and `_ct` (prompt/completion token counts) are computed once at the top of the `isinstance(_tok_info, dict)` block and reused in both `_node_usages.append()` and the cost block, eliminating double `_safe_token_int()` calls. - **M-1 fix**: Parallel branch execution now cancels sibling tasks when one branch raises an exception, preventing continued budget spending after a limit breach. - **N1 (comment added)**: `except BaseException` in the parallel execution block is now documented explaining why `BaseException` (not `Exception`) is required — `asyncio.CancelledError` is a `BaseException` in Python 3.8+. - **N2/N3 fix**: Removed `import sys` inside function bodies (moved to module level, then removed since `print(..., file=sys.stderr)` calls were replaced with `self.logger.warning(...)` calls for consistency with the rest of the codebase). ### `cleveractors/runtime_dispatch.py` - `_execute_graph()` passes `limits=executor.limits` and `pricing=executor.pricing` to `PureLangGraph()`. ### `cleveractors/__init__.py` - `ExecutionError` added to imports and `__all__`. ### New BDD tests (`features/execution_limits.feature`, 38 scenarios) - All 5 limit types verified to raise `ExecutionError` with the correct `kind` (and `reason` where applicable). - Missing pricing entry scenario: provider-missing and model-missing cases both tested. - **C-1 coverage (corrected)**: Non-numeric `max_cost_usd` raises `ExecutionError(kind="cost")` with `reason=""` (not `reason="missing_pricing_entry"`). - **Bool max_cost_usd coverage**: Bool `False` as `max_cost_usd` raises `ExecutionError(kind="cost")`. - **Bool timeout_ms coverage**: Bool `True` as `timeout_ms` raises `ExecutionError(kind="timeout")`. - **Non-numeric/bool max_depth coverage**: New scenarios verify `ExecutionError(kind="depth")` for non-numeric and bool `max_depth` values. - **M-4 coverage**: Non-numeric and bool `max_model_calls`/`max_tool_calls` raise structured errors. - **m-7 coverage**: `timeout_ms=0` raises `ExecutionError(kind="timeout")`. - **m-1 coverage (strengthened)**: Non-dict `_node_token_usage` scenario now also asserts that a warning was logged (not just that no error was raised). The logger is patched in the Then step to capture the warning call. - **m-4 coverage**: Cost accumulation across two LLM nodes verified. - **m-5 coverage**: Completion tokens cost contribution verified. - **m-6 fix**: Happy-path scenarios now assert `result is not None` in addition to absence of error. - **m-3 fix**: Propagation scenario now patches `PureLangGraph.__init__` to verify `limits`/`pricing` kwargs are actually passed by `_execute_graph()`. - **M-1 coverage (strengthened)**: Parallel graph scenario now uses a "splitter" node topology (since the `start` node handler only routes to `next_nodes[0]`). A `branch_b_cancelled` flag is set inside `except asyncio.CancelledError` and asserted in a new `Then` step, verifying that sibling cancellation actually occurred. - **Scenario text fixes**: "a parallel graph where one branch raises a depth error" → "a parallel graph where one branch raises an ExecutionError". "a graph with an LLM node using 1000 prompt tokens and max_cost_usd 1.00" → "a graph with an LLM node for non-numeric max_cost_usd validation" (the old Given text was misleading since the actual limit value is set in the When step). - `ExecutionError` export from `cleveractors` top-level verified. - Full dispatch path integration test — `Executor.execute()` → `_execute_graph()` → `PureLangGraph` limit enforcement verified end-to-end. - **N5 fix**: In-function imports removed from `execution_limits_steps.py`; `patch`, `create_executor`, and `_pg_module` are now top-level imports. ### Updated cycle-detection tests - `features/steps/pure_graph_coverage_steps.py`: `auto_finish_active` self-loop and ping-pong bypass tests now track visit counts and assert `visit_count[0] >= 2`, matching the pattern already used in `pure_graph_coverage_gaps_v2_steps.py`. The ping-pong bypass test also makes the agent return a routing command (`GOTO_agent:continue`) so the "no routing command" early-exit does not fire before the ping-pong detection is exercised. ### `CHANGELOG.md` - Added entry under `[Unreleased] ### Added`. ## Known Limitations / Deferred Items None. All review comments have been addressed. ## Quality Gate Results - `nox -e lint`: ✅ pass - `nox -e typecheck` (Pyright): ✅ 0 errors - `nox -e unit_tests`: ✅ 2335/2335 scenarios pass - `nox -e integration_tests`: ✅ 156/156 tests pass - `nox -e coverage_report`: ✅ 97.2% (threshold 96.5%) ## ADR Reference This PR implements [ADR-2029: Actor Execution Limits and Budget Enforcement via cleveractors-core](https://git.cleverthis.com/cleveragents/cleveragents-webapp/src/branch/develop/docs/adr/ADR-2029-actor-execution-limits-and-budget-enforcement-via-cleveractors-core.md) — Wave 6 of the CleverActors integration epic (cleveragents/cleveragents-webapp#275). Closes #15
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Self-QA Review — feat/execution-limits (ADR-2029, issue #15)

Self-QA performed against ADR-2029, issue #15 spec, and the epic context (cleveragents/cleveragents-webapp#275). All findings have been fixed in this review cycle and are included in the amended commit 9a346cd.


What Was Correct

  • ExecutionError fieldskind and reason added with correct defaults (""); backward-compatible with all existing raise ExecutionError(msg) call sites.
  • All 5 limits enforced in PureLangGraph — depth (strict raise vs. legacy heuristic), max_model_calls, max_tool_calls, timeout_ms (via asyncio.wait_for), max_cost_usd.
  • Check-before-execute semantics — model/tool call counters increment atomically (no await between check and increment), making parallel-branch enforcement race-free under asyncio's cooperative model.
  • ExecutionError re-raise guardexcept ExecutionError: raise placed before the broad except Exception handler correctly prevents limit errors from being swallowed when raised inside the try block (e.g., from post-execution cost accounting code).
  • Timeout exception chainasyncio.TimeoutError caught and re-raised as ExecutionError(kind="timeout") before exiting execute(); the finally block (which resets is_running) always runs correctly even on timeout.
  • Counter reset on each execute() call_model_call_count, _tool_call_count, _accumulated_cost all reset at the start of execute().
  • _execute_graph wiringexecutor.limits and executor.pricing correctly forwarded to PureLangGraph(limits=..., pricing=...).
  • ExecutionError exported — added to cleveractors/__init__.py and __all__.
  • Original 19 BDD scenarios — comprehensive coverage of all 5 limit types, both budget_exhausted and missing_pricing_entry sub-codes, and backward compatibility (empty pricing skips cost).

🔴 Major Finding — Fixed

Pricing rate validation gap (ADR-2029 spec violation)

_execute_from_node validated that the provider and model keys existed in the pricing dict and were dicts themselves, but did not validate that the prompt and completion rate keys were present with numeric values. Two failure modes:

  1. Missing rate key{"openai": {"gpt-4.1-mini": {"completion": 0.60}}} (no prompt key): _model_pricing.get("prompt", 0.0) silently returns 0.0, cost is computed as $0 regardless of token volume, and budget_exhausted never fires.
  2. Non-numeric rate value{"openai": {"gpt-4.1-mini": {"prompt": "not-a-number"}}}: float("not-a-number") raises ValueError, which is caught by the broad except Exception handler and swallowed — cost enforcement is bypassed silently.

Both cases violate the explicit ADR-2029 constraint: "Proceeding with a missing or zero price is forbidden — this would enable unbounded upstream spend with no billing enforcement."

Fix applied (src/cleveractors/langgraph/pure_graph.py):

After confirming _model_pricing is a dict, the code now:

  1. Checks that "prompt" and "completion" keys are present — raises missing_pricing_entry if either is absent.
  2. Wraps the float() conversion in try/except (TypeError, ValueError) and raises ExecutionError(kind="cost", reason="missing_pricing_entry") on conversion failure — so a malformed rate never silently bypasses enforcement.

New BDD scenarios added:

  • LLM node with incomplete model pricing entry missing prompt rate raises missing_pricing_entry
  • LLM node with non-numeric pricing rate raises missing_pricing_entry

🟡 Minor Finding — Fixed

Propagation test did not exercise the actual dispatch path

The existing scenario "limits and pricing are passed through runtime_dispatch to PureLangGraph" only asserted executor.limits == expected and executor.pricing == expected. It verified that the Executor stores the values but did not exercise the path Executor.execute() → _execute_graph() → PureLangGraph(limits=executor.limits, ...). The step description says "the PureLangGraph should have the correct limits and pricing" but the assertion never touched PureLangGraph internals.

Fix applied: Added a new integration scenario that exercises the full dispatch path:

Scenario: Executor.execute() enforces max_depth through the full dispatch path (elim)
  Given an Executor with a 2-node graph and max_depth 0 (elim)
  When the executor execute method is called with a test message (elim)
  Then an ExecutionError should be raised with kind "depth" (elim)

This runs create_executor(graph_config, limits={"max_depth": 0}) → executor.execute("test message") through the real _execute_graph() dispatch and verifies ExecutionError(kind="depth") propagates from PureLangGraph._execute_from_node() all the way to the caller.


Quality Gates After Fixes

Gate Result
nox -s lint pass
nox -s typecheck 0 errors
nox -s unit_tests 2320/2320 pass (+3 new scenarios)
nox -s coverage_report 97.2% (threshold 96.5%)

Informational — Out of Scope

_execute_llm path does not enforce timeout_ms or max_cost_usd: For actors of type=llm, limits are not applied (no PureLangGraph involved). Intentional per issue #15 scope ("enforce all 5 execution limits in PureLangGraph"). Worth tracking if LLM-type actors need budget enforcement in a future wave.

create_pure_langgraph() factory does not accept limits/pricing: Legacy factory used by ReactiveCleverAgentsApp. Not a concern for the router integration path (which uses _execute_graphPureLangGraph directly).


Self-QA Verdict: All findings fixed. Quality gates pass at 97.2% coverage.

## Self-QA Review — feat/execution-limits (ADR-2029, issue #15) Self-QA performed against ADR-2029, issue #15 spec, and the epic context (cleveragents/cleveragents-webapp#275). All findings have been fixed in this review cycle and are included in the amended commit `9a346cd`. --- ### ✅ What Was Correct - **`ExecutionError` fields** — `kind` and `reason` added with correct defaults (`""`); backward-compatible with all existing `raise ExecutionError(msg)` call sites. - **All 5 limits enforced in `PureLangGraph`** — depth (strict raise vs. legacy heuristic), `max_model_calls`, `max_tool_calls`, `timeout_ms` (via `asyncio.wait_for`), `max_cost_usd`. - **Check-before-execute semantics** — model/tool call counters increment atomically (no await between check and increment), making parallel-branch enforcement race-free under asyncio's cooperative model. - **`ExecutionError` re-raise guard** — `except ExecutionError: raise` placed before the broad `except Exception` handler correctly prevents limit errors from being swallowed when raised inside the try block (e.g., from post-execution cost accounting code). - **Timeout exception chain** — `asyncio.TimeoutError` caught and re-raised as `ExecutionError(kind="timeout")` before exiting `execute()`; the `finally` block (which resets `is_running`) always runs correctly even on timeout. - **Counter reset on each `execute()` call** — `_model_call_count`, `_tool_call_count`, `_accumulated_cost` all reset at the start of `execute()`. - **`_execute_graph` wiring** — `executor.limits` and `executor.pricing` correctly forwarded to `PureLangGraph(limits=..., pricing=...)`. - **`ExecutionError` exported** — added to `cleveractors/__init__.py` and `__all__`. - **Original 19 BDD scenarios** — comprehensive coverage of all 5 limit types, both `budget_exhausted` and `missing_pricing_entry` sub-codes, and backward compatibility (empty pricing skips cost). --- ### 🔴 Major Finding — Fixed **Pricing rate validation gap (ADR-2029 spec violation)** `_execute_from_node` validated that the provider and model keys existed in the pricing dict and were dicts themselves, but did not validate that the `prompt` and `completion` rate keys were present with numeric values. Two failure modes: 1. **Missing rate key** — `{"openai": {"gpt-4.1-mini": {"completion": 0.60}}}` (no `prompt` key): `_model_pricing.get("prompt", 0.0)` silently returns `0.0`, cost is computed as $0 regardless of token volume, and `budget_exhausted` never fires. 2. **Non-numeric rate value** — `{"openai": {"gpt-4.1-mini": {"prompt": "not-a-number"}}}`: `float("not-a-number")` raises `ValueError`, which is caught by the broad `except Exception` handler and swallowed — cost enforcement is bypassed silently. Both cases violate the explicit ADR-2029 constraint: _"Proceeding with a missing or zero price is forbidden — this would enable unbounded upstream spend with no billing enforcement."_ **Fix applied** (`src/cleveractors/langgraph/pure_graph.py`): After confirming `_model_pricing` is a `dict`, the code now: 1. Checks that `"prompt"` and `"completion"` keys are present — raises `missing_pricing_entry` if either is absent. 2. Wraps the `float()` conversion in `try/except (TypeError, ValueError)` and raises `ExecutionError(kind="cost", reason="missing_pricing_entry")` on conversion failure — so a malformed rate never silently bypasses enforcement. **New BDD scenarios added:** - `LLM node with incomplete model pricing entry missing prompt rate raises missing_pricing_entry` - `LLM node with non-numeric pricing rate raises missing_pricing_entry` --- ### 🟡 Minor Finding — Fixed **Propagation test did not exercise the actual dispatch path** The existing scenario _"limits and pricing are passed through runtime_dispatch to PureLangGraph"_ only asserted `executor.limits == expected` and `executor.pricing == expected`. It verified that the `Executor` stores the values but did not exercise the path `Executor.execute() → _execute_graph() → PureLangGraph(limits=executor.limits, ...)`. The step description says "the PureLangGraph should have the correct limits and pricing" but the assertion never touched `PureLangGraph` internals. **Fix applied**: Added a new integration scenario that exercises the full dispatch path: ```gherkin Scenario: Executor.execute() enforces max_depth through the full dispatch path (elim) Given an Executor with a 2-node graph and max_depth 0 (elim) When the executor execute method is called with a test message (elim) Then an ExecutionError should be raised with kind "depth" (elim) ``` This runs `create_executor(graph_config, limits={"max_depth": 0}) → executor.execute("test message")` through the real `_execute_graph()` dispatch and verifies `ExecutionError(kind="depth")` propagates from `PureLangGraph._execute_from_node()` all the way to the caller. --- ### Quality Gates After Fixes | Gate | Result | |------|--------| | `nox -s lint` | ✅ pass | | `nox -s typecheck` | ✅ 0 errors | | `nox -s unit_tests` | ✅ 2320/2320 pass (+3 new scenarios) | | `nox -s coverage_report` | ✅ 97.2% (threshold 96.5%) | --- ### Informational — Out of Scope **`_execute_llm` path does not enforce `timeout_ms` or `max_cost_usd`**: For actors of type=`llm`, limits are not applied (no `PureLangGraph` involved). Intentional per issue #15 scope ("enforce all 5 execution limits **in PureLangGraph**"). Worth tracking if LLM-type actors need budget enforcement in a future wave. **`create_pure_langgraph()` factory does not accept `limits`/`pricing`**: Legacy factory used by `ReactiveCleverAgentsApp`. Not a concern for the router integration path (which uses `_execute_graph` → `PureLangGraph` directly). --- **Self-QA Verdict: All findings fixed. Quality gates pass at 97.2% coverage.**
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Self-QA Review — Cycle 3 (Final)

Verdict: Approve

The implementation is functionally correct and complete. All 5 execution limits are properly enforced per ADR-2029, the ExecutionError structured fields are correctly implemented, the wiring from _execute_graph() to PureLangGraph is correct, and the 38 BDD scenarios provide solid coverage.


What Was Verified

  • ExecutionError(kind, reason) fields correctly defined with proper defaults and backward compatibility.
  • All 5 limits enforced with correct semantics: max_depth uses > comparison with 2**31-1 fallback; model/tool counters use check-before-execute; asyncio.wait_for correctly wraps the execution coroutine; cost accumulation uses the correct per-million-token formula; missing pricing entries are hard errors (no zero-cost fallback).
  • The end/END terminal node short-circuit is correctly placed before the depth check.
  • Parallel branch cancellation on limit breach is correctly implemented with except BaseException and explicit t.cancel().
  • The ExecutionError re-raise guard (except ExecutionError: raise) correctly prevents limit errors from being swallowed by the broad except Exception.
  • Defensive copies of limits (shallow) and pricing (deep) are correctly applied.
  • ExecutionError is correctly exported from cleveractors.__all__.
  • Malformed limit values (max_cost_usd, max_depth, max_model_calls, max_tool_calls, timeout_ms) all raise structured ExecutionError with the correct kind field; bool values are explicitly rejected.
  • reason="" (not reason="missing_pricing_entry") is correctly used for malformed max_cost_usd per ADR-2029 semantics.
  • Parallel cancellation test verifies actual cancellation via branch_b_cancelled flag.
  • Warning log test verifies the warning is actually emitted for non-dict _node_token_usage.

Remaining Minor Items (non-blocking)

These are code quality suggestions with no correctness impact, suitable for a follow-up PR:

  • DRY: The "bool guard + try/except coerce + boundary check" pattern is repeated 5 times. A _validate_numeric_limit() helper would reduce duplication.
  • Magic numbers: 2**31 - 1 and 1_000_000.0 could be named module-level constants (_DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH, _TOKENS_PER_PRICING_UNIT).
  • create_pure_langgraph() factory: Silently omits limits/pricing with no docstring note. Should document that callers needing ADR-2029 enforcement must use PureLangGraph(...) directly.
  • Warning assertion: step_elim_assert_warning_logged accepts four loose substrings; tightening to "_node_token_usage" would be more precise.
  • Dead mock_logger: The outer patch.object(_pg_module, "_logger") in the warning test is unused; the inner patch.object(graph, "logger") is the one actually used.

Quality Gates

Gate Result
nox -e lint pass
nox -e typecheck 0 errors
nox -e unit_tests 2335/2335 scenarios
nox -e integration_tests 156/156 tests
nox -e coverage_report 97.2% (threshold 96.5%)

Full self-QA implementation notes (all 3 cycles) are posted on ticket #15.

## Self-QA Review — Cycle 3 (Final) **Verdict: ✅ Approve** The implementation is functionally correct and complete. All 5 execution limits are properly enforced per ADR-2029, the `ExecutionError` structured fields are correctly implemented, the wiring from `_execute_graph()` to `PureLangGraph` is correct, and the 38 BDD scenarios provide solid coverage. --- ### What Was Verified - `ExecutionError(kind, reason)` fields correctly defined with proper defaults and backward compatibility. - All 5 limits enforced with correct semantics: `max_depth` uses `>` comparison with `2**31-1` fallback; model/tool counters use check-before-execute; `asyncio.wait_for` correctly wraps the execution coroutine; cost accumulation uses the correct per-million-token formula; missing pricing entries are hard errors (no zero-cost fallback). - The `end`/`END` terminal node short-circuit is correctly placed **before** the depth check. - Parallel branch cancellation on limit breach is correctly implemented with `except BaseException` and explicit `t.cancel()`. - The `ExecutionError` re-raise guard (`except ExecutionError: raise`) correctly prevents limit errors from being swallowed by the broad `except Exception`. - Defensive copies of `limits` (shallow) and `pricing` (deep) are correctly applied. - `ExecutionError` is correctly exported from `cleveractors.__all__`. - Malformed limit values (`max_cost_usd`, `max_depth`, `max_model_calls`, `max_tool_calls`, `timeout_ms`) all raise structured `ExecutionError` with the correct `kind` field; bool values are explicitly rejected. - `reason=""` (not `reason="missing_pricing_entry"`) is correctly used for malformed `max_cost_usd` per ADR-2029 semantics. - Parallel cancellation test verifies actual cancellation via `branch_b_cancelled` flag. - Warning log test verifies the warning is actually emitted for non-dict `_node_token_usage`. --- ### Remaining Minor Items (non-blocking) These are code quality suggestions with no correctness impact, suitable for a follow-up PR: - **DRY:** The "bool guard + `try/except` coerce + boundary check" pattern is repeated 5 times. A `_validate_numeric_limit()` helper would reduce duplication. - **Magic numbers:** `2**31 - 1` and `1_000_000.0` could be named module-level constants (`_DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH`, `_TOKENS_PER_PRICING_UNIT`). - **`create_pure_langgraph()` factory:** Silently omits `limits`/`pricing` with no docstring note. Should document that callers needing ADR-2029 enforcement must use `PureLangGraph(...)` directly. - **Warning assertion:** `step_elim_assert_warning_logged` accepts four loose substrings; tightening to `"_node_token_usage"` would be more precise. - **Dead `mock_logger`:** The outer `patch.object(_pg_module, "_logger")` in the warning test is unused; the inner `patch.object(graph, "logger")` is the one actually used. --- ### Quality Gates | Gate | Result | |------|--------| | `nox -e lint` | ✅ pass | | `nox -e typecheck` | ✅ 0 errors | | `nox -e unit_tests` | ✅ 2335/2335 scenarios | | `nox -e integration_tests` | ✅ 156/156 tests | | `nox -e coverage_report` | ✅ 97.2% (threshold 96.5%) | Full self-QA implementation notes (all 3 cycles) are posted on ticket #15.
Author
Member

PR #44 Review: cleveragents/cleveractors-core

1. Does the code implement what the ticket requires?

Yes — all acceptance criteria are fully met.

Acceptance Criterion Status
ExecutionError.kind and .reason fields, defaulting to "" exceptions.py
max_depth enforcement replacing heuristic → ExecutionError(kind="depth") pure_graph.py
max_model_calls counter, checked before AGENT node → ExecutionError(kind="model_calls") pure_graph.py
max_tool_calls counter, checked before TOOL node → ExecutionError(kind="tool_calls") pure_graph.py
timeout_ms via asyncio.wait_forExecutionError(kind="timeout") pure_graph.py
max_cost_usd cumulative enforcement → kind="cost", reason="budget_exhausted" pure_graph.py
Missing pricing entry → kind="cost", reason="missing_pricing_entry" (no zero-cost fallback) pure_graph.py
Wire executor.limits and executor.pricing into PureLangGraph runtime_dispatch.py
Export ExecutionError from top-level __all__ __init__.py
Tests for all 5 limit types + missing pricing entry 38 BDD scenarios

A few extra-mile correctness improvements were also included beyond the spec:

  • C-2 fix: end/END terminal node short-circuit moved before the depth check, ensuring any graph can always complete even at max_depth.
  • M-1 fix: Parallel branches now cancel sibling tasks on exception (prevents budget overspend after a limit breach).
  • Bool guards on all numeric limit fields (prevents silent float(True)==1.0 gotchas).

2. Does the code break anything?

No regressions on existing behavior. One intentional behavior change that is correctly handled:

The one meaningful behavioral change: depth default

  • Old: max(2000, len(self.nodes) * 50) — a heuristic safety net that silently returned the current message on overflow.
  • New: Default ceiling is 2**31 - 1 (per ADR-2029). Overflow now raises ExecutionError(kind="depth") instead of silently returning.

Is it safe? Yes, for two reasons:

  1. Any cycle that was previously stopped by the heuristic at ~2000 steps is still protected by the existing ping-pong and same-message loop detectors, which remain unchanged and fire much earlier.
  2. The two affected tests (auto_finish_active self-loop, ping-pong bypass) were correctly updated: they now pass limits={"max_depth": 50} so the graph terminates cleanly, and their assertions check visit_count[0] >= 2 to confirm the bypass actually ran.

Other things that are not broken

  • Backward compatibility of ExecutionError: All existing raise ExecutionError(msg) call sites are untouched — kind and reason default to "".
  • runtime_dispatch.py exception chain: ExecutionError was already in the explicit re-raise list (except (ConfigurationError, AgentCreationError, ExecutionError): raise), so the new structured errors propagate correctly without being double-wrapped.
  • Per-execution counters reset properly: _model_call_count, _tool_call_count, _accumulated_cost, _node_message_visits, and _execution_path are all reset at the top of execute() before each invocation.
  • Concurrency safety: is_running guard still prevents re-entrant execution on the same instance.
  • Token usage accumulation: _node_usages.append(...) runs regardless of pricing; the if self._pricing: block gates only cost calculation, not token accounting.
  • Empty pricing = no cost enforcement (intentional, tested by the "empty pricing table" scenario).

Minor observations (not blockers)

  1. _execution_path.pop() is skipped on exception paths, leaving a stale trailing entry. Since execution terminates on any limit exception and the path is reset at the start of the next execute() call, this has no real impact.
  2. The max_depth bool-check and int() cast runs on every recursive call. For depth 100 this is 100 trivial operations — no real concern.

Verdict

The PR faithfully implements everything the ticket requires. The behavioral change in the depth default is intentional, documented, and properly mitigated in the existing cycle-detection tests. No existing functionality is broken. The quality gate results (2335/2335 scenarios, 97.2% coverage, 0 Pyright errors) are consistent with the code quality I see here. This PR is good to merge.

## PR #44 Review: cleveragents/cleveractors-core ### 1. Does the code implement what the ticket requires? **Yes — all acceptance criteria are fully met.** | Acceptance Criterion | Status | |---|---| | `ExecutionError.kind` and `.reason` fields, defaulting to `""` | ✅ `exceptions.py` | | `max_depth` enforcement replacing heuristic → `ExecutionError(kind="depth")` | ✅ `pure_graph.py` | | `max_model_calls` counter, checked before AGENT node → `ExecutionError(kind="model_calls")` | ✅ `pure_graph.py` | | `max_tool_calls` counter, checked before TOOL node → `ExecutionError(kind="tool_calls")` | ✅ `pure_graph.py` | | `timeout_ms` via `asyncio.wait_for` → `ExecutionError(kind="timeout")` | ✅ `pure_graph.py` | | `max_cost_usd` cumulative enforcement → `kind="cost"`, `reason="budget_exhausted"` | ✅ `pure_graph.py` | | Missing pricing entry → `kind="cost"`, `reason="missing_pricing_entry"` (no zero-cost fallback) | ✅ `pure_graph.py` | | Wire `executor.limits` and `executor.pricing` into `PureLangGraph` | ✅ `runtime_dispatch.py` | | Export `ExecutionError` from top-level `__all__` | ✅ `__init__.py` | | Tests for all 5 limit types + missing pricing entry | ✅ 38 BDD scenarios | A few extra-mile correctness improvements were also included beyond the spec: - **C-2 fix**: `end`/`END` terminal node short-circuit moved *before* the depth check, ensuring any graph can always complete even at max_depth. - **M-1 fix**: Parallel branches now cancel sibling tasks on exception (prevents budget overspend after a limit breach). - **Bool guards** on all numeric limit fields (prevents silent `float(True)==1.0` gotchas). --- ### 2. Does the code break anything? **No regressions on existing behavior.** One intentional behavior change that is correctly handled: #### The one meaningful behavioral change: depth default - **Old**: `max(2000, len(self.nodes) * 50)` — a heuristic safety net that silently returned the current message on overflow. - **New**: Default ceiling is `2**31 - 1` (per ADR-2029). Overflow now raises `ExecutionError(kind="depth")` instead of silently returning. **Is it safe?** Yes, for two reasons: 1. Any cycle that was previously stopped by the heuristic at ~2000 steps is still protected by the existing ping-pong and same-message loop detectors, which remain unchanged and fire much earlier. 2. The two affected tests (`auto_finish_active` self-loop, ping-pong bypass) were correctly updated: they now pass `limits={"max_depth": 50}` so the graph terminates cleanly, and their assertions check `visit_count[0] >= 2` to confirm the bypass actually ran. #### Other things that are not broken - **Backward compatibility of `ExecutionError`**: All existing `raise ExecutionError(msg)` call sites are untouched — `kind` and `reason` default to `""`. ✅ - **`runtime_dispatch.py` exception chain**: `ExecutionError` was already in the explicit re-raise list (`except (ConfigurationError, AgentCreationError, ExecutionError): raise`), so the new structured errors propagate correctly without being double-wrapped. ✅ - **Per-execution counters reset properly**: `_model_call_count`, `_tool_call_count`, `_accumulated_cost`, `_node_message_visits`, and `_execution_path` are all reset at the top of `execute()` before each invocation. ✅ - **Concurrency safety**: `is_running` guard still prevents re-entrant execution on the same instance. ✅ - **Token usage accumulation**: `_node_usages.append(...)` runs regardless of pricing; the `if self._pricing:` block gates only cost calculation, not token accounting. ✅ - **Empty pricing = no cost enforcement** (intentional, tested by the "empty pricing table" scenario). ✅ #### Minor observations (not blockers) 1. `_execution_path.pop()` is skipped on exception paths, leaving a stale trailing entry. Since execution terminates on any limit exception and the path is reset at the start of the next `execute()` call, this has no real impact. 2. The `max_depth` bool-check and `int()` cast runs on every recursive call. For depth 100 this is 100 trivial operations — no real concern. --- ### Verdict The PR faithfully implements everything the ticket requires. The behavioral change in the depth default is intentional, documented, and properly mitigated in the existing cycle-detection tests. No existing functionality is broken. The quality gate results (2335/2335 scenarios, 97.2% coverage, 0 Pyright errors) are consistent with the code quality I see here. **This PR is good to merge.**
hurui200320 deleted branch feat/execution-limits 2026-06-11 11:05:30 +00:00
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