HAL9000
d7639635fc
Remove all # noqa: ANN205 suppressions from container_tool_exec_steps.py
that were applied to already-annotated (-> None) functions, which caused
RUF100 (Unused noqa directive) lint failures. Add the missing Behave step
definitions required by path_containment_security.feature:
- Given a temporary sandbox directory "{path}"
- When I map the host path "{path}" to container
- Then the mapped path should be "{expected}"
Also rename ambiguous "the result should be true/false" steps to
"the host containment result should be true/false" to avoid AmbiguousStep
conflicts with the parametrized step in cli_steps.py.
ISSUES CLOSED: #7478
49 lines
2.5 KiB
Gherkin
49 lines
2.5 KiB
Gherkin
Feature: Path containment startswith bypass prevention (issue #7478 / PR #7801)
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AS a security engineer
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I WANT path containment checks to use semantic comparison instead of string prefix matching
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SO THAT sibling-directory prefix-collision attacks cannot bypass sandbox isolation
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Background:
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Given a temporary sandbox directory "/tmp/sandbox"
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And a file "safe.txt" with content "safe content"
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# ---- PathMapper _is_under prefix collision prevention (#7478) ----
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@tdd_issue @tdd_issue_7478
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Scenario: PathMapper rejects sibling-prefix path traversal via relpath containment
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Given I have a PathMapper with host_root "/tmp/sandbox" and container_root "/workspace"
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And a sibling directory with a name that is a prefix of the sandbox root
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When I check whether host path is safe from prefix collision
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Then the prefix collision check should return ``False``
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@tdd_issue @tdd_issue_7478
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Scenario: PathMapper correctly identifies legitimate child paths
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Given I have a PathMapper with host_root "/tmp/sandbox" and container_root "/workspace"
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When I check whether "/tmp/sandbox/src/main.py" is a host path
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Then the host containment result should be true
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@tdd_issue @tdd_issue_7478
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Scenario: PathMapper correctly identifies root equality
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Given I have a PathMapper with host_root "/tmp/sandbox" and container_root "/workspace"
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When I check whether "/tmp/sandbox" is a host path
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Then the host containment result should be true
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@tdd_issue @tdd_issue_7478
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Scenario: PathMapper rejects sibling-prefix escape path
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Given I have a PathMapper with host_root "/tmp/sandbox" and container_root "/workspace"
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And a file "escape-evil.txt" with content "malicious" at "/tmp/sandbox-escape/escape-evil.txt"
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When I check whether "/tmp/sandbox-escape/escape-evil.txt" is a host path
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Then the host containment result should be false
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@tdd_issue @tdd_issue_7478
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Scenario: PathMapper maps root path exactly (no relative component)
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Given I have a PathMapper with host_root "/tmp/sandbox" and container_root "/workspace"
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When I map the host path "/tmp/sandbox" to container
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Then the mapped path should be "/workspace"
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@tdd_issue @tdd_issue_7478
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Scenario: PathMapper maps a child path correctly through relpath
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Given I have a PathMapper with host_root "/tmp/sandbox" and container_root "/workspace"
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When I map the host path "/tmp/sandbox/src/main.py" to container
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Then the mapped path should be "/workspace/src/main.py"
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