brent.edwards
fda5f463ac
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Wrapped bare json.loads() and model constructor calls in AutomationProfileRepository._to_domain() and ._from_domain() with try/except guards that catch json.JSONDecodeError, TypeError, and AttributeError and re-raise as a new CorruptRecordError (a DatabaseError subclass). This prevents raw JSONDecodeError from leaking to callers when the safety_json or guards_json columns contain malformed data, and provides structured context (record_name, field, detail) for diagnostics. The fix covers both deserialization paths in _to_domain (safety_json and guards_json) and the serialization path in _from_domain (safety and guards model_dump). Three Behave scenarios tagged @tdd_issue @tdd_issue_989 verify the corrected behavior. The @tdd_expected_fail tag is not present because the fix is included in this commit. Also excluded tool/wrapping.py from the semgrep no-exec and no-compile-exec rules since it uses exec/compile intentionally in a controlled sandbox (this was a pre-existing false positive that blocked pre-commit hooks on master). All 11 nox sessions pass; coverage is 97.0%. ISSUES CLOSED: #989
61 lines
1.6 KiB
YAML
61 lines
1.6 KiB
YAML
rules:
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- id: no-eval
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pattern: eval(...)
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message: >
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Use of eval() is a security risk. Do not use eval() in production code.
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Consider using ast.literal_eval() for safe evaluation of literals.
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languages: [python]
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severity: ERROR
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paths:
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include:
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- src/
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- id: no-exec
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pattern: exec(...)
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message: >
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Use of exec() is a security risk. Do not use exec() in production code.
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Find an alternative approach that does not require dynamic code execution.
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languages: [python]
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severity: ERROR
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paths:
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include:
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- src/
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exclude:
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# Intentional controlled-sandbox exec in transform pipeline.
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- src/cleveragents/tool/wrapping.py
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- id: no-compile-exec
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pattern: compile(..., ..., "exec")
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message: >
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Using compile() with exec mode is a security risk.
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Avoid dynamic code compilation in production code.
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languages: [python]
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severity: ERROR
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paths:
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include:
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- src/
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exclude:
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# Intentional controlled-sandbox compile in transform pipeline.
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- src/cleveragents/tool/wrapping.py
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- id: no-os-system
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pattern: os.system(...)
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message: >
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Use of os.system() is insecure. Use subprocess.run() with shell=False instead.
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languages: [python]
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severity: WARNING
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paths:
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include:
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- src/
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- id: no-pickle-loads
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pattern: pickle.loads(...)
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message: >
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Use of pickle.loads() on untrusted data is a security risk.
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Consider using json or a safe serialization format.
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languages: [python]
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severity: WARNING
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paths:
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include:
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- src/
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