diff --git a/features/quality_gates_command_injection.feature b/features/quality_gates_command_injection.feature
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b18268b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/features/quality_gates_command_injection.feature
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Feature: Quality gates script prevents command injection attacks
+  As a security-conscious developer
+  I want the quality gates script to validate all path arguments
+  So that command injection attacks cannot be executed through path manipulation
+
+  Background:
+    Given the quality gates script is available
+    And the project root is set correctly
+
+  Scenario: Valid paths are accepted
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents"
+    Then the path validation should succeed
+    And the validated path should be absolute
+
+  Scenario: Empty paths are rejected
+    When I validate the path ""
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "Path cannot be empty"
+
+  Scenario: Nonexistent paths are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents/not_a_real_path_7286"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "Path does not exist"
+
+  Scenario: Paths with path traversal are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/../../../etc/passwd"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  @tdd_issue @tdd_issue_7286
+  Scenario: Paths with semicolon are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents;rm -rf /"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  Scenario: Paths with pipe are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents|cat /etc/passwd"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  Scenario: Paths with ampersand are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents&whoami"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  Scenario: Paths with dollar sign are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents$(whoami)"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  Scenario: Paths with backticks are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents`whoami`"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  Scenario: Paths with parentheses are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents(whoami)"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  Scenario: Paths with angle brackets are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents<file"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  Scenario: Paths with newlines are rejected
+    When I validate the path "src/cleveragents\nmalicious"
+    Then the path validation should fail
+    And the path validation error should contain "dangerous pattern"
+
+  Scenario: Security check uses validated paths
+    When I run the security check
+    Then the subprocess should not be called with shell=True
+    And all path arguments should be validated
+
+  Scenario: Dead code check uses validated paths
+    When I run the dead code check
+    Then the subprocess should not be called with shell=True
+    And all path arguments should be validated
+
+  Scenario: Complexity check uses validated paths
+    When I run the complexity check
+    Then the subprocess should not be called with shell=True
+    And all path arguments should be validated
diff --git a/features/steps/quality_gates_command_injection_steps.py b/features/steps/quality_gates_command_injection_steps.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..864a9a1e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/features/steps/quality_gates_command_injection_steps.py
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+"""Step definitions for quality gates command injection tests."""
+
+import importlib.util
+import os
+import types
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from behave import given, then, when
+from behave.runner import Context
+
+
+_SCRIPT_PATH = (
+    Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent / "scripts" / "check-quality-gates.py"
+)
+
+
+def _load_quality_gates_module() -> types.ModuleType:
+    """Load the check-quality-gates.py script as a module via importlib."""
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("check_quality_gates", _SCRIPT_PATH)
+    if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
+        raise ImportError(f"Cannot load module from {_SCRIPT_PATH}")
+    mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
+    return mod
+
+
+_qg = _load_quality_gates_module()
+
+
+@given("the quality gates script is available")
+def step_script_available(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Verify the quality gates script is available."""
+    script_path = Path("scripts/check-quality-gates.py")
+    assert script_path.exists(), f"Script {script_path} does not exist"
+
+
+@given("the project root is set correctly")
+def step_project_root_set(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Set up the project root context."""
+    context.original_cwd = os.getcwd()
+
+
+@when('I validate the path "{path_str}"')
+def step_validate_path(context: Context, path_str: str) -> None:
+    """Validate a path string."""
+    context.path_str = path_str
+    context.validation_error = None
+    context.validated_path = None
+
+    try:
+        context.validated_path = _qg.validate_path(path_str)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        context.validation_error = str(e)
+
+
+@when('I validate the path ""')
+def step_validate_empty_path(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Validate an empty path string."""
+    step_validate_path(context, "")
+
+
+@then("the path validation should succeed")
+def step_validation_success(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Assert that validation succeeded."""
+    assert context.validation_error is None, (
+        f"Expected validation to succeed but got: {context.validation_error}"
+    )
+    assert context.validated_path is not None, "Expected a validated path"
+
+
+@then("the path validation should fail")
+def step_validation_fail(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Assert that validation failed."""
+    assert context.validation_error is not None, (
+        "Expected validation to fail but it succeeded"
+    )
+
+
+@then("the validated path should be absolute")
+def step_path_is_absolute(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Assert that the returned path is absolute."""
+    assert context.validated_path is not None, "No validated path available"
+    assert context.validated_path.is_absolute(), (
+        f"Expected absolute path but got: {context.validated_path}"
+    )
+
+
+@then('the path validation error should contain "{text}"')
+def step_error_contains_text(context: Context, text: str) -> None:
+    """Assert that the path validation error message contains specific text."""
+    assert context.validation_error is not None, "No error message available"
+    assert text.lower() in context.validation_error.lower(), (
+        f"Expected error to contain '{text}' but got: {context.validation_error}"
+    )
+
+
+@when("I run the security check")
+def step_run_security_check(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Run the security check function."""
+    mock_result = MagicMock(returncode=0, stdout='{"results": []}', stderr="")
+    with patch.object(_qg.subprocess, "run", return_value=mock_result) as mock_run:
+        context.security_result = _qg.check_security()
+        context.mock_run = mock_run
+
+
+@when("I run the dead code check")
+def step_run_dead_code_check(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Run the dead code check function."""
+    mock_result = MagicMock(returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="")
+    with patch.object(_qg.subprocess, "run", return_value=mock_result) as mock_run:
+        context.dead_code_result = _qg.check_dead_code()
+        context.mock_run = mock_run
+
+
+@when("I run the complexity check")
+def step_run_complexity_check(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Run the complexity check function."""
+    mock_result = MagicMock(returncode=0, stdout="{}", stderr="")
+    with patch.object(_qg.subprocess, "run", return_value=mock_result) as mock_run:
+        context.complexity_result = _qg.check_complexity()
+        context.mock_run = mock_run
+
+
+@then("the subprocess should not be called with shell=True")
+def step_subprocess_shell_not_true(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Assert subprocess.run does not enable shell execution."""
+    assert hasattr(context, "mock_run"), "No mock_run available"
+    for call in context.mock_run.call_args_list:
+        kwargs = (
+            call.kwargs
+            if hasattr(call, "kwargs")
+            else (call[1] if len(call) > 1 else {})
+        )
+        assert kwargs.get("shell") is not True, (
+            f"Expected shell not to be True but got: {kwargs.get('shell')}"
+        )
+
+
+@then("all path arguments should be validated")
+def step_all_paths_validated(context: Context) -> None:
+    """Assert that path arguments were resolved before subprocess execution."""
+    assert hasattr(context, "mock_run"), "No mock_run available"
+    assert context.mock_run.called, "subprocess.run was not called"
+    path_like_args = []
+    for call in context.mock_run.call_args_list:
+        cmd = call.args[0] if call.args else call.kwargs.get("args", [])
+        for arg in cmd:
+            if not isinstance(arg, str):
+                continue
+            if "/" in arg or arg.endswith((".py", ".toml")):
+                path_like_args.append(arg)
+
+    assert path_like_args, "No path-like subprocess arguments were found"
+    for arg in path_like_args:
+        assert Path(arg).is_absolute(), f"Path argument was not validated: {arg}"
diff --git a/scripts/check-quality-gates.py b/scripts/check-quality-gates.py
index 91d4ee883..9a64defea 100644
--- a/scripts/check-quality-gates.py
+++ b/scripts/check-quality-gates.py
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Aggregates results from multiple quality tools and produces a summary
 report. Returns non-zero exit code if any critical gate fails.
 
 Usage:
-    python scripts/check-quality-gates.py [--coverage-min 85] [--complexity-max 10]
+    python scripts/check-quality-gates.py [--coverage-min 85] [--complexity-max E]
 
 Gates checked:
     1. Coverage >= threshold (default 85%)
@@ -17,10 +17,80 @@ Gates checked:
 
 import argparse
 import json
+import re
 import subprocess
 import sys
 from pathlib import Path
 
+_SAFE_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_./-]+$")
+
+
+def validate_path(path_str: str, project_root: Path | None = None) -> Path:
+    """Validate and sanitize a path argument to prevent command injection.
+
+    Checks for safe path characters, dangerous shell metacharacters, path
+    traversal patterns, project-root containment, and on-disk existence.
+
+    Args:
+        path_str: The path string to validate
+        project_root: Optional project root for relative path validation
+
+    Returns:
+        A validated, resolved Path object
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: If the path is invalid or contains dangerous patterns
+    """
+    if not path_str:
+        raise ValueError("Path cannot be empty")
+
+    # Check for dangerous patterns that could be used for injection
+    dangerous_patterns = [
+        "..",  # Path traversal
+        ";",  # Command separator
+        "|",  # Pipe operator
+        "&",  # Background/AND operator
+        "$",  # Variable/command substitution
+        "`",  # Backtick command substitution (deprecated)
+        "(",  # Subshell grouping start
+        ")",  # Subshell grouping end
+        "<",  # Input redirection
+        ">",  # Output redirection
+        "\n",  # Newline injection
+        "\r",  # Carriage return injection
+        "\\n",  # Escaped newline injection in feature/CLI input
+        "\\r",  # Escaped carriage return injection in feature/CLI input
+    ]
+    for pattern in dangerous_patterns:
+        if pattern in path_str:
+            raise ValueError(f"Path contains dangerous pattern: {pattern}")
+
+    if _SAFE_PATH_RE.fullmatch(path_str) is None:
+        raise ValueError("Path contains characters outside the safe allowlist")
+
+    # Convert to Path object
+    path_obj = Path(path_str)
+
+    # Resolve to absolute path to prevent traversal
+    try:
+        resolved = path_obj.resolve()
+    except (OSError, RuntimeError) as e:
+        raise ValueError(f"Cannot resolve path: {e}") from e
+
+    if not resolved.is_file() and not resolved.is_dir():
+        raise ValueError(f"Path does not exist: {resolved}")
+
+    # If project_root is provided, ensure path is within it
+    if project_root is not None:
+        project_root_resolved = project_root.resolve()
+        try:
+            resolved.relative_to(project_root_resolved)
+        except ValueError as e:
+            msg = f"Path {resolved} is outside project root {project_root_resolved}"
+            raise ValueError(msg) from e
+
+    return resolved
+
 
 def check_coverage(min_coverage: float) -> tuple[bool, str]:
     """Check test coverage meets minimum threshold."""
@@ -66,13 +136,21 @@ def check_typecheck() -> tuple[bool, str]:
 
 def check_security() -> tuple[bool, str]:
     """Check bandit finds no high-severity issues."""
+    # Validate the path argument to prevent command injection
+    try:
+        project_root = Path(".").resolve()
+        config_path = validate_path("pyproject.toml", project_root)
+        src_path = validate_path("src/cleveragents", project_root)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        return False, f"Security: invalid path - {e}"
+
     result = subprocess.run(
         [
             "bandit",
             "-c",
-            "pyproject.toml",
+            str(config_path),
             "-r",
-            "src/cleveragents",
+            str(src_path),
             "--severity-level",
             "high",
             "--format",
@@ -96,15 +174,21 @@ def check_security() -> tuple[bool, str]:
 
 def check_dead_code() -> tuple[bool, str]:
     """Check vulture finds no dead code."""
+    # Validate path arguments to prevent command injection
+    try:
+        project_root = Path(".").resolve()
+        src_path = validate_path("src/cleveragents", project_root)
+        whitelist_path = validate_path("vulture_whitelist.py", project_root)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        return False, f"Dead code: invalid path - {e}"
+
     result = subprocess.run(
         [
             "vulture",
-            "src/cleveragents",
-            "vulture_whitelist.py",
+            str(src_path),
+            str(whitelist_path),
             "--min-confidence",
             "80",
-            "--exclude",
-            "src/cleveragents/discovery",
         ],
         capture_output=True,
         text=True,
@@ -118,11 +202,18 @@ def check_dead_code() -> tuple[bool, str]:
 
 def check_complexity(max_grade: str = "E") -> tuple[bool, str]:
     """Check no functions exceed maximum complexity grade."""
+    # Validate path argument to prevent command injection
+    try:
+        project_root = Path(".").resolve()
+        src_path = validate_path("src/cleveragents", project_root)
+    except ValueError as e:
+        return False, f"Complexity: invalid path - {e}"
+
     result = subprocess.run(
         [
             "radon",
             "cc",
-            "src/cleveragents",
+            str(src_path),
             "--min",
             max_grade,
             "--show-complexity",