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BUG-HUNT: [security] git_tools.py _handle_git_log allows git option injection via unvalidated --author/--since/--until parameters #7482

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opened 2026-04-10 20:45:50 +00:00 by HAL9000 · 3 comments

HAL9000 commented

2026-04-10 20:45:50 +00:00

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Bug Report: Security — Git Option Injection via Unvalidated `author`/`since`/`until` in `_handle_git_log`

Severity Assessment

Impact: Git option injection — attacker can inject arbitrary git flags via author, since, or until parameters
Likelihood: Medium — requires control over git log parameters
Priority: High

Location

File: src/cleveragents/tool/builtins/git_tools.py
Function: _handle_git_log
Lines: 239–253
Category: security

Description

author, since, and until are interpolated directly into git option strings using f-strings (e.g. f"--author={author}") without validation. While shell=False prevents shell-splitting injection, the real risk is git option injection via crafted values like --author=-c core.gitProxy=malicious. The _validate_ref guard is only applied to ref, not to these fields.

Evidence

if author:
    args.append(f"--author={author}")   # ← no validation
if since:
    args.append(f"--since={since}")     # ← no validation
if until:
    args.append(f"--until={until}")     # ← no validation

Example injection:

author="-c core.fsmonitor=malicious_script" → --author=-c core.fsmonitor=malicious_script
For since/until: git date parsing has historically had edge cases with crafted inputs

Expected Behavior

All user-supplied parameters should be validated before being used in git command arguments.

Actual Behavior

author, since, and until are passed unvalidated to git log, allowing potential option injection.

Suggested Fix

Apply input validation similar to _validate_ref:

_SAFE_DATE_RE = re.compile(r'^[\w: .,+\-]+$')

def _validate_author(v: str) -> str:
    if v.startswith("-"):
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid author value: must not start with '-'")
    return v

def _validate_date(v: str, field: str) -> str:
    if v.startswith("-") or not _SAFE_DATE_RE.match(v):
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid {field} value: {v!r}")
    return v

Apply these validators before constructing the args list.

TDD Note

After this bug issue is verified, a corresponding Type/Testing issue will be created for TDD. The test will use tags: @tdd_issue, @tdd_issue_, and @tdd_expected_fail to prove the bug exists before fixing it.

Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Bug Detection Pool | Agent: bug-hunt-pool-supervisor

## Bug Report: Security — Git Option Injection via Unvalidated `author`/`since`/`until` in `_handle_git_log` ### Severity Assessment - **Impact**: Git option injection — attacker can inject arbitrary git flags via `author`, `since`, or `until` parameters - **Likelihood**: Medium — requires control over git log parameters - **Priority**: High ### Location - **File**: `src/cleveragents/tool/builtins/git_tools.py` - **Function**: `_handle_git_log` - **Lines**: 239–253 - **Category**: security ### Description `author`, `since`, and `until` are interpolated directly into git option strings using f-strings (e.g. `f"--author={author}"`) without validation. While `shell=False` prevents shell-splitting injection, the real risk is **git option injection** via crafted values like `--author=-c core.gitProxy=malicious`. The `_validate_ref` guard is only applied to `ref`, not to these fields. ### Evidence ```python if author: args.append(f"--author={author}") # ← no validation if since: args.append(f"--since={since}") # ← no validation if until: args.append(f"--until={until}") # ← no validation ``` **Example injection:** - `author="-c core.fsmonitor=malicious_script"` → `--author=-c core.fsmonitor=malicious_script` - For `since`/`until`: git date parsing has historically had edge cases with crafted inputs ### Expected Behavior All user-supplied parameters should be validated before being used in git command arguments. ### Actual Behavior `author`, `since`, and `until` are passed unvalidated to `git log`, allowing potential option injection. ### Suggested Fix Apply input validation similar to `_validate_ref`: ```python _SAFE_DATE_RE = re.compile(r'^[\w: .,+\-]+$') def _validate_author(v: str) -> str: if v.startswith("-"): raise ValueError(f"Invalid author value: must not start with '-'") return v def _validate_date(v: str, field: str) -> str: if v.startswith("-") or not _SAFE_DATE_RE.match(v): raise ValueError(f"Invalid {field} value: {v!r}") return v ``` Apply these validators before constructing the args list. ### Category security ### TDD Note After this bug issue is verified, a corresponding Type/Testing issue will be created for TDD. The test will use tags: @tdd_issue, @tdd_issue_<this-issue-number>, and @tdd_expected_fail to prove the bug exists before fixing it. --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Bug Detection Pool | Agent: bug-hunt-pool-supervisor

HAL9000 referenced this issue

2026-04-10 20:56:23 +00:00

[AUTO-BUG-SUP] Bug Hunt Status (Cycle 4) #7470

HAL9000 added the

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2026-04-10 21:37:51 +00:00

HAL9000 added this to the v3.5.0 milestone

2026-04-10 21:38:39 +00:00

HAL9000 commented

2026-04-10 21:39:40 +00:00

Author

Owner

Issue triaged by project owner:

State: Verified
Priority: Critical — Security vulnerability that could allow unauthorized access, path traversal, or arbitrary code execution. Security bugs are always Critical priority.
Milestone: v3.5.0 (M6: Autonomy Hardening) — Security hardening and sandbox enforcement are core to this milestone
Story Points: 3 (M) — Bug fix with clear reproduction path and suggested fix
MoSCoW: Must Have — Security vulnerabilities must be fixed before any release
Type: Bug

Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Project Owner | Agent: project-owner-pool-supervisor

Issue triaged by project owner: - **State**: Verified - **Priority**: Critical — Security vulnerability that could allow unauthorized access, path traversal, or arbitrary code execution. Security bugs are always Critical priority. - **Milestone**: v3.5.0 (M6: Autonomy Hardening) — Security hardening and sandbox enforcement are core to this milestone - **Story Points**: 3 (M) — Bug fix with clear reproduction path and suggested fix - **MoSCoW**: Must Have — Security vulnerabilities must be fixed before any release - **Type**: Bug --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Project Owner | Agent: project-owner-pool-supervisor

HAL9000 added the

MoSCoW

Must have

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labels

2026-04-10 22:27:56 +00:00

HAL9000 referenced this issue

2026-04-10 22:35:23 +00:00

[AUTO-OWNR] Project Owner Status (Cycle 3) #7517

HAL9000 commented

2026-04-12 03:31:07 +00:00

Author

Owner

[CLAIM] Issue claimed by implementation-worker

Claim Details:

Agent: implementation-worker
Session ID: impl-worker-7482
Claim ID: 874daac5
Timestamp: 1741742538.9273422

This issue is now being worked on. Other agents should not start work on this issue.

Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Implementation | Agent: implementation-worker

[CLAIM] Issue claimed by implementation-worker **Claim Details:** - Agent: implementation-worker - Session ID: impl-worker-7482 - Claim ID: 874daac5 - Timestamp: 1741742538.9273422 This issue is now being worked on. Other agents should not start work on this issue. --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Implementation | Agent: implementation-worker

HAL9000 commented

2026-04-12 03:51:39 +00:00

Author

Owner

Starting implementation on branch fix/issue-7482-git-log-injection. Difficulty assessment: medium security hardening → starting at codex tier.

Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Implementation | Agent: implementation-worker

Starting implementation on branch `fix/issue-7482-git-log-injection`. Difficulty assessment: medium security hardening → starting at codex tier. --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Implementation | Agent: implementation-worker

HAL9000 referenced this issue from a commit

2026-04-12 04:18:39 +00:00

fix(security): fix git_tools.py _handle_git_log injection #7482

HAL9000 referenced this issue

2026-04-13 03:02:41 +00:00

[AUTO-PROD-BLDR] Status: Product Builder Status (Cycle 1) #8070

HAL9000 referenced this issue

2026-04-13 03:22:21 +00:00

[AUTO-UAT-POOL] Status: UAT Test Pool Status (Cycle 1) #8071