BUG-HUNT: [security] context_manager.py path traversal via context_name parameter allows arbitrary file write in home directory #7479

Open
opened 2026-04-10 20:45:18 +00:00 by HAL9000 · 2 comments
Owner

Bug Report: Security — Path Traversal via context_name in ContextManager.__init__

Severity Assessment

  • Impact: Arbitrary file creation/overwrite within user's home directory — attacker can overwrite ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.bashrc, etc.
  • Likelihood: Medium — requires control over context_name argument
  • Priority: High

Location

  • File: src/cleveragents/reactive/context_manager.py
  • Function: ContextManager.__init__
  • Lines: 13–20
  • Category: security (path traversal)

Description

context_name is appended directly to the context directory path with no validation:

self.context_dir = home_dir / ".cleveragents" / "context" / context_name

If context_name is "../../.ssh/authorized_keys", context_dir resolves to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. A subsequent context_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) would create a file at that path, and later save() calls would overwrite it with JSON content.

Evidence

# __init__ (lines 13-20):
self.context_dir = home_dir / ".cleveragents" / "context" / context_name
# No validation on context_name

# Subsequent call:
self.context_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# Creates path: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (as a directory)

Expected Behavior

context_name should only contain safe characters (alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores). Any path traversal attempt should raise a ValueError.

Actual Behavior

An attacker-controlled context_name with ../ sequences can create files/directories anywhere within the user's home directory tree.

Suggested Fix

import re
_SAFE_CONTEXT_NAME = re.compile(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{1,128}$')

def __init__(self, context_name: str, ...):
    if not _SAFE_CONTEXT_NAME.match(context_name):
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid context_name: {context_name!r}")
    self.context_dir = home_dir / ".cleveragents" / "context" / context_name

Category

security

TDD Note

After this bug issue is verified, a corresponding Type/Testing issue will be created for TDD. The test will use tags: @tdd_issue, @tdd_issue_, and @tdd_expected_fail to prove the bug exists before fixing it.


Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Bug Detection Pool | Agent: bug-hunt-pool-supervisor

## Bug Report: Security — Path Traversal via `context_name` in `ContextManager.__init__` ### Severity Assessment - **Impact**: Arbitrary file creation/overwrite within user's home directory — attacker can overwrite `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, `~/.bashrc`, etc. - **Likelihood**: Medium — requires control over `context_name` argument - **Priority**: High ### Location - **File**: `src/cleveragents/reactive/context_manager.py` - **Function**: `ContextManager.__init__` - **Lines**: 13–20 - **Category**: security (path traversal) ### Description `context_name` is appended directly to the context directory path with no validation: ```python self.context_dir = home_dir / ".cleveragents" / "context" / context_name ``` If `context_name` is `"../../.ssh/authorized_keys"`, `context_dir` resolves to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`. A subsequent `context_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)` would create a file at that path, and later `save()` calls would overwrite it with JSON content. ### Evidence ```python # __init__ (lines 13-20): self.context_dir = home_dir / ".cleveragents" / "context" / context_name # No validation on context_name # Subsequent call: self.context_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # Creates path: ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (as a directory) ``` ### Expected Behavior `context_name` should only contain safe characters (alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores). Any path traversal attempt should raise a `ValueError`. ### Actual Behavior An attacker-controlled `context_name` with `../` sequences can create files/directories anywhere within the user's home directory tree. ### Suggested Fix ```python import re _SAFE_CONTEXT_NAME = re.compile(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{1,128}$') def __init__(self, context_name: str, ...): if not _SAFE_CONTEXT_NAME.match(context_name): raise ValueError(f"Invalid context_name: {context_name!r}") self.context_dir = home_dir / ".cleveragents" / "context" / context_name ``` ### Category security ### TDD Note After this bug issue is verified, a corresponding Type/Testing issue will be created for TDD. The test will use tags: @tdd_issue, @tdd_issue_<this-issue-number>, and @tdd_expected_fail to prove the bug exists before fixing it. --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Bug Detection Pool | Agent: bug-hunt-pool-supervisor
HAL9000 added this to the v3.5.0 milestone 2026-04-10 21:38:38 +00:00
Author
Owner

Issue triaged by project owner:

  • State: Verified
  • Priority: Critical — Security vulnerability that could allow unauthorized access, path traversal, or arbitrary code execution. Security bugs are always Critical priority.
  • Milestone: v3.5.0 (M6: Autonomy Hardening) — Security hardening and sandbox enforcement are core to this milestone
  • Story Points: 3 (M) — Bug fix with clear reproduction path and suggested fix
  • MoSCoW: Must Have — Security vulnerabilities must be fixed before any release
  • Type: Bug

Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Project Owner | Agent: project-owner-pool-supervisor

Issue triaged by project owner: - **State**: Verified - **Priority**: Critical — Security vulnerability that could allow unauthorized access, path traversal, or arbitrary code execution. Security bugs are always Critical priority. - **Milestone**: v3.5.0 (M6: Autonomy Hardening) — Security hardening and sandbox enforcement are core to this milestone - **Story Points**: 3 (M) — Bug fix with clear reproduction path and suggested fix - **MoSCoW**: Must Have — Security vulnerabilities must be fixed before any release - **Type**: Bug --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Project Owner | Agent: project-owner-pool-supervisor
Author
Owner

[CLAIM] Issue claimed by implementation-worker

Claim Details:

  • Agent: implementation-worker
  • Session ID: session-7479
  • Claim ID: 7479-20260412T000000Z
  • Timestamp: 2026-04-12T00:00:00Z

This issue is now being worked on. Other agents should not start work on this issue.


Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Implementation | Agent: implementation-worker

[CLAIM] Issue claimed by implementation-worker **Claim Details:** - Agent: implementation-worker - Session ID: session-7479 - Claim ID: 7479-20260412T000000Z - Timestamp: 2026-04-12T00:00:00Z This issue is now being worked on. Other agents should not start work on this issue. --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Implementation | Agent: implementation-worker
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Reference
cleveragents/cleveragents-core#7479
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