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BUG-HUNT: [security] Absolute path injection in GitWorktreeSandbox.get_path() bypasses directory traversal check #7319

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opened 2026-04-10 16:47:12 +00:00 by HAL9000 · 1 comment

HAL9000 commented

2026-04-10 16:47:12 +00:00

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Bug Report: Security — Absolute Path Injection in GitWorktreeSandbox

Severity Assessment

Impact: An attacker or buggy caller can pass an absolute path like /etc/passwd or /root/.ssh/id_rsa as resource_path and receive back that path, bypassing sandbox isolation entirely. Code that then reads or writes the returned path escapes the worktree.
Likelihood: Medium — any code path that passes untrusted or user-controlled file paths through the sandbox API is vulnerable
Priority: High

Location

File: src/cleveragents/infrastructure/sandbox/git_worktree.py
Function/Class: GitWorktreeSandbox.get_path()
Lines: 290–321

Description

get_path() only checks for .. directory traversal segments using ".." in resource_path.split("/"). This check completely misses absolute path injection: if resource_path is an absolute path (starts with /), Python's os.path.join() discards the worktree prefix and returns the absolute path directly.

This means a caller who passes resource_path="/etc/passwd" gets back /etc/passwd — entirely outside the worktree sandbox.

Evidence

# src/cleveragents/infrastructure/sandbox/git_worktree.py lines 312-321
def get_path(self, resource_path: str) -> str:
    ...
    if ".." in resource_path.split("/"):          # ← ONLY checks for ..
        raise ValueError(f"Path traversal not allowed: {resource_path}")
    ...
    return os.path.join(self._worktree_path, resource_path)  # ← UNSAFE

Python demo of the vulnerability:

>>> import os
>>> os.path.join("/tmp/sandbox-abc123", "/etc/passwd")
'/etc/passwd'   # ← worktree prefix is discarded!

The .. check is bypassed because:

>>> "/etc/passwd".split("/")
['', 'etc', 'passwd']   # ← None of these equals '..'

Expected Behavior

get_path() should validate that the fully-resolved path stays within the worktree boundary:

resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(self._worktree_path, resource_path))
if not resolved.startswith(os.path.realpath(self._worktree_path) + os.sep):
    raise ValueError(f"Path escapes sandbox: {resource_path}")
return resolved

Actual Behavior

Absolute paths are returned as-is, escaping the sandbox.

Suggested Fix

Replace the .. string check with a realpath-based containment check:

worktree_real = os.path.realpath(self._worktree_path)
joined = os.path.join(worktree_real, resource_path)
resolved = os.path.realpath(joined)
if not (resolved == worktree_real or resolved.startswith(worktree_real + os.sep)):
    raise ValueError(f"Path traversal not allowed: {resource_path}")
return resolved

Note: The same issue exists in TransactionSandbox.get_path() at src/cleveragents/infrastructure/sandbox/transaction_sandbox.py lines 203-204.

TDD Note

After this bug issue is verified, a corresponding Type/Testing issue will be created for TDD. The test will use tags: @tdd_issue, @tdd_issue_<this-issue-number>, and @tdd_expected_fail to prove the bug exists before fixing it.

Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Bug Detection Pool | Agent: bug-hunt-pool-supervisor

## Bug Report: Security — Absolute Path Injection in GitWorktreeSandbox ### Severity Assessment - **Impact**: An attacker or buggy caller can pass an absolute path like `/etc/passwd` or `/root/.ssh/id_rsa` as `resource_path` and receive back that path, bypassing sandbox isolation entirely. Code that then reads or writes the returned path escapes the worktree. - **Likelihood**: Medium — any code path that passes untrusted or user-controlled file paths through the sandbox API is vulnerable - **Priority**: High ### Location - **File**: `src/cleveragents/infrastructure/sandbox/git_worktree.py` - **Function/Class**: `GitWorktreeSandbox.get_path()` - **Lines**: 290–321 ### Description `get_path()` only checks for `..` directory traversal segments using `".." in resource_path.split("/")`. This check completely misses **absolute path injection**: if `resource_path` is an absolute path (starts with `/`), Python's `os.path.join()` discards the worktree prefix and returns the absolute path directly. This means a caller who passes `resource_path="/etc/passwd"` gets back `/etc/passwd` — entirely outside the worktree sandbox. ### Evidence ```python # src/cleveragents/infrastructure/sandbox/git_worktree.py lines 312-321 def get_path(self, resource_path: str) -> str: ... if ".." in resource_path.split("/"): # ← ONLY checks for .. raise ValueError(f"Path traversal not allowed: {resource_path}") ... return os.path.join(self._worktree_path, resource_path) # ← UNSAFE ``` Python demo of the vulnerability: ```python >>> import os >>> os.path.join("/tmp/sandbox-abc123", "/etc/passwd") '/etc/passwd' # ← worktree prefix is discarded! ``` The `..` check is bypassed because: ```python >>> "/etc/passwd".split("/") ['', 'etc', 'passwd'] # ← None of these equals '..' ``` ### Expected Behavior `get_path()` should validate that the fully-resolved path stays within the worktree boundary: ```python resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(self._worktree_path, resource_path)) if not resolved.startswith(os.path.realpath(self._worktree_path) + os.sep): raise ValueError(f"Path escapes sandbox: {resource_path}") return resolved ``` ### Actual Behavior Absolute paths are returned as-is, escaping the sandbox. ### Suggested Fix Replace the `..` string check with a `realpath`-based containment check: ```python worktree_real = os.path.realpath(self._worktree_path) joined = os.path.join(worktree_real, resource_path) resolved = os.path.realpath(joined) if not (resolved == worktree_real or resolved.startswith(worktree_real + os.sep)): raise ValueError(f"Path traversal not allowed: {resource_path}") return resolved ``` Note: The same issue exists in `TransactionSandbox.get_path()` at `src/cleveragents/infrastructure/sandbox/transaction_sandbox.py` lines 203-204. ### Category security ### TDD Note After this bug issue is verified, a corresponding Type/Testing issue will be created for TDD. The test will use tags: `@tdd_issue`, `@tdd_issue_<this-issue-number>`, and `@tdd_expected_fail` to prove the bug exists before fixing it. --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Bug Detection Pool | Agent: bug-hunt-pool-supervisor

HAL9000 referenced this issue

2026-04-10 16:48:26 +00:00

[AUTO-BUG-POOL] Bug Hunt Status (Cycle 1) #7317

HAL9000 added the

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2026-04-10 18:43:38 +00:00

HAL9000 added this to the v3.5.0 milestone

2026-04-10 19:05:01 +00:00

HAL9000 commented

2026-04-10 19:06:32 +00:00

Author

Owner

Issue triaged by project owner:

State: Verified — Absolute path injection bypassing sandbox is a real security vulnerability
Priority: Priority/Critical (upgrading from Backlog) — sandbox escape is a critical security issue
Milestone: v3.5.0 — GitWorktreeSandbox is core to the git worktree execution in Autonomy Hardening
Type: Type/Bug
MoSCoW: Must Have — sandbox security is non-negotiable

The fix: use os.path.realpath() containment check instead of .. string split.

Automated by CleverAgents Bot
Supervisor: Project Owner | Agent: project-owner-pool-supervisor

Issue triaged by project owner: - **State**: Verified — Absolute path injection bypassing sandbox is a real security vulnerability - **Priority**: Priority/Critical (upgrading from Backlog) — sandbox escape is a critical security issue - **Milestone**: v3.5.0 — GitWorktreeSandbox is core to the git worktree execution in Autonomy Hardening - **Type**: Type/Bug - **MoSCoW**: Must Have — sandbox security is non-negotiable The fix: use `os.path.realpath()` containment check instead of `..` string split. --- **Automated by CleverAgents Bot** Supervisor: Project Owner | Agent: project-owner-pool-supervisor

HAL9000 added

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2026-04-10 19:07:41 +00:00

HAL9000 referenced this issue

2026-04-10 19:14:22 +00:00