Security issues in CleverAgents... #7
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Reference: cleveragents/cleveragents-core#7
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Here are some security problems found within commit
4947b17521, which is the currentmasterbranch of cleveragents-core.Bandit has found security problems. (I consider using
evalwith a user-supplied function to be a high-severity security problem, not medium.)Here are results:
agents/base.py
One basic memory lock is used in
AgentWithMemoryfor_process_wrapper,update_memory, andget_memory.I don't think
Lockis a reentrant lock. If_process_wrappercalls a method that eventually callsget_memory, would there be a deadlock?agents/composite.py
claude-3.7-sonnetreports the following:Component Isolation (High Risk)
• The CompositeAgent combines multiple agents, graphs, and streams without clear isolation boundaries.
• If one component is compromised, it could potentially affect others within the same composite.
• Recommendation: Implement stronger isolation between components, possibly using separate execution contexts or sandboxing.
agents/llm.py
If we ever allow outside programs as agents here, we should be much more careful with
self.config.get("api_key"). For now, that should be okay.agents/tool.py
From bandit:
The
evalfunction is critical to fix.Lines 153-159 read:
This is emphatically not enough security. If I recall correctly, you wrote a bunch of examples of bad things that could be done. You should change this code so that bad examples do not get through.
This part of the code is going to be very, very important when the software goes out. It should be easy to change and modify and fix.
The method
_http_request_toolmakes me very nervous. It can be used to get any http resource that the agent can reach. In particular:Lines 277-285 read:
I don't think that's enough security for safe mode. It doesn't stop safe mode from following soft links. If the user could create a soft link to
/, then the whole file system could be read from safe mode.There's the chance that this code will run on Windows. The filepath should be compared against both
/and drive letters in Windows.langgraph/nodes.py
From bandit:
templates/base.py
From bandit:
templates/graph_templates.py
From bandit:
templates/inline_jinja_handler.py
From bandit:
templates/jinja_yaml_preprocessor.py:
From bandit:
templates/renderer.py:
From bandit:
templates/stream_templates.py:
From bandit:
templates/yaml_jinja_loader.py:
From bandit:
templates/yaml_preprocessor.py
From bandit:
templates/yaml_template_engine.py
From bandit: