fix(security): restore posixpath containment checks in path_mapper.py
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Remove unused import os that triggers lint/typecheck failures and
replace os.path.relpath() usage with posixpath.relpath() throughout
path_mapper.py. Container paths are always POSIX — mixing os.path breaks
cross-platform correctness for non-POSIX hosts and was the sole functional
change on this PR branch (the actual security fix was already merged to master).

All reviewers flagged: unused import (ci/lint), wrong import domain
(ci/typecheck, ci/quality), and mismatch with master's posixpath-only
implementation.

Closes #7478
Refs: #11217
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-16 06:36:35 +00:00
parent b0db5d715f
commit db50d039d6
+15 -21
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ Based on issue #515 — container-aware tool execution and I/O forwarding.
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import posixpath
from dataclasses import dataclass
@@ -162,23 +161,22 @@ def _normalise(path: str) -> str:
def _is_under(path: str, root: str) -> bool:
"""Return ``True`` if *path* is at or within the directory tree of
*root*, using canonical rel-path containment checks.
"""Return ``True`` if *path* is equal to or a child of *root*.
This replaces the former ``path.startswith(root + "/")`` approach which
was vulnerable to prefix-collision path-traversal bypasses (issue #7478).
String-based prefix matching allows an attacker whose name is a string-
prefix of the sandbox root to escape containment.
Uses semantic path containment via posixpath.relpath instead of
string prefix matching (str.startswith). String prefix matching
is vulnerable to sibling-directory prefix-collision attacks where
/tmp/sandbox would incorrectly match /tmp/sandboxmalicious/file.
Uses ``os.path.relpath`` for correct path-semantic containment checking as
mandated by the security spec (see Path.is_relative_to semantics on paths
where files may not exist).
See issue #7478 — startswith bypass in path containment checks.
"""
rel = os.path.relpath(path, root)
# Rel-path returns empty string ('') when equal, "." or a non-".."-prefixed
# path when contained, or "../..." when *outside* the root.
components = rel.replace("\\", "/").split("/")
return all(c != ".." for c in components)
if path == root:
return True
try:
relative = posixpath.relpath(path, root)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return False
return not relative.startswith(".." + posixpath.sep) and relative != ".."
def _relative_to(path: str, root: str) -> str:
@@ -186,10 +184,6 @@ def _relative_to(path: str, root: str) -> str:
Assumes :func:`_is_under` has already been checked.
"""
rel = os.path.relpath(path, root)
# Strip leading "." for a child path (relpath returns "." when path
# equals root). When the path equals the root we get "" which is fine
# for callers that check for that separately.
if rel == ".":
if path == root:
return ""
return rel.replace("\\", "/")
return path[len(root) + 1 :]