Expose sandboxed read_file/write_file helpers to inline code (Python_exec) in unsafe mode #93
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opened 2026-07-31 19:26:18 +00:00 by CoreRasurae
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aditya (Aditya Chhabra)
aleenaumair (Aleena Umair)
brent.edwards (Brent Edwards)
CoreRasurae (Luis Mendes)
drew (Drew Morris)
eugen.thaci (Eugen Thaci)
freemo (Jeffrey Phillips Freeman)
HAL9000 (HAL 9000)
HAL9001 (HAL9001)
hamza.khyari (Hamza Khyari)
hurui200320 (Rui Hu)
justin.morris
khird (Kyle Hird)
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#77 Epic: LLM Agent Runtime Stabilization — reliability, resource enforcement & correctness hardening
cleveragents/cleveractors-core
Reference: cleveragents/cleveractors-core#93
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Metadata
feat(agents): expose sandboxed file helpers to inline codefeature/m1-inline-code-sandboxed-file-accessBackground and context
Inline-code tools (§4.5.2) — e.g. a
Python_exec-styletype: toolagent witha
codebody — run in the restricted sandbox (§13.2). Today that sandboxexposes no filesystem access at all:
open()is not in the §13.2.1 built-in setand §13.2.3 prohibits arbitrary filesystem I/O unconditionally. That is
conformant, but it means inline code cannot read or write file contents
dynamically from within a single code body; the only sanctioned path is static
composition (
file_readtool → inline tool →file_writetool), which does notcover dynamic or multi-file access.
ADR-2035 (
docs/adr/ADR-2035-inline-code-sandboxed-file-access.md) decidesto close this gap with sanctioned helper functions rather than raw
open():two callables,
read_file/write_file, injected into the inline sandbox inunsafe mode, reusing the existing
file_read/file_writevalidated cores andconfined to the sandbox root. This issue implements that decision and applies
the specification amendments the ADR mandates.
Current behavior
open()in any mode; noread_file/write_filefacility exists.
input_datafrom a separately-wired
file_readtool.Expected behavior
Per ADR-2035, when the host is in unsafe mode the inline sandbox gains exactly
two injected local callables (like
json), and nothing else widens:read_file(path, max_chars=None, offset=0) -> str— returns the raw decodedfile contents, reusing the
file_readcore (incl. ADR-2033 offset/max_charswindowing). Returns content, not the
[FILE_READ_SUCCESS]LLM envelope.write_file(path, content, mode="w") -> int— writes via thefile_writecore (§4.5.5 modes), returns characters written.
Both helpers confine access to the sandbox root and preserve the existing
read/write privilege split.
Acceptance criteria
read_fileandwrite_fileare available as injectedlocals inside inline-code bodies; in safe mode they are absent (referencing
them raises
NameError).open,os,io,pathlib, and file descriptors remain unavailable toinline code (the §13.2.1 built-in table is unchanged).
read_filereturns the raw decoded content asstr, honoringmax_charsand
offsetwith the same semantics as thefile_readtool.write_filewrites via thefile_writecore, honorsw/a/insertmodes, and returns the number of characters written.
..traversal,~expansion, and anypath whose resolved real path (symlinks followed) falls outside the sandbox
root; a violation raises
ValueErrornaming the offending path.write_fileperforms a write only when the invocation context contains_unsafe_mode: true; without it, it raisesValueError.read_filedoesnot require
_unsafe_mode.docs/index.mdis updated per ADR-2035 D-6 (§13.2.3 reworded, §4.5.2 liststhe helpers, §13.2.1 note, §13.3 cross-reference) in the same change.
transform.fn, bridge predicates) isunchanged and gains no file access.
Supporting information
docs/adr/ADR-2035-inline-code-sandboxed-file-access.md(Status: proposed → must be accepted before this issue starts).
docs/index.md— §4.5.2 (inline tools / injected facilities), §4.5.1 &§4.5.5 (
file_read/file_writetools and modes), §13.2.1 (inline built-ins),§13.2.3 (prohibited capabilities), §13.3 (filesystem boundaries), §4.5.4
(safe-mode restrictions).
offset/max_charswindowing forread_file.Subtasks
file_read/file_writevalidation+I/O cores so they can backboth the built-in tools and the injected helpers (single validation
surface).
symlink-escape rejection,
../~rejection), raisingValueError.read_fileandwrite_fileover those cores; gatewrite_fileon
_unsafe_mode.unsafe mode; ensure they are absent otherwise.
docs/index.mdper ADR-2035 D-6, in the same commit as the code.offset/max_chars, write modes,
_unsafe_mode-absent write rejection, andsandbox-escape attempts (
.., absolute,~, symlink-out-of-root).real file within the sandbox, and rejecting an escape attempt.
nox -s coverage_report.nox(all default sessions), fix any errors.Definition of Done
This issue is complete when:
docs/index.mdin this change.
Metadata exactly.
master, reviewed, and merged.